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ABSTRACT
South Korea’s democratization process appears to have begun in 1986, when President
Chun responded to massive civilian protest and announced a direct and free election. But
Korea’s 1 road to democracy was much longer than meets the eye. Dated from the moment of
Korea’s independence after the Japanese surrender, it took more than 40 years to arrive at those
transition elections, and sustain a true, liberal democratization process.
This thesis asks: What delayed South Korea’s democracy? To answer this question, I
argue that South Korea’s democratization has been delayed due to the lack of legal justice, truth
finding and reconciliation processes at certain moments of South Korea’s modern history.
Specifically, the thesis employs the methodology of process tracing and path dependency
analysis, and identifies two critical junctures when impunity was allowed to stand, “veto players”
–both internal and external— asserted their power, and democratization was held back. These
critical junctures are 1) the post-World War II period, when the newly established South Korean
government failed to prosecute pro-Japanese collaborators, and 2) the 1980’s, when dictator Park
was assassinated and the interim government failed to hold the Park administration accountable
for its wrong doings. A main theme that is pervasive throughout the thesis is that the U.S.
policies played a major role in affecting Korea’s delayed democratization. Indeed it is the
interaction of internal and external factors that accounts for the reinforcement of the impunity
path over time. I then conclude by discussing the current state of Korea’s democracy, specifically
evaluating the impact of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, established in 2005, and its
attempt to bring some means of justice after sixty years of impunity.

1

In this thesis, Korea and South Korea will be used interchangeably.
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INTRODUCTION
In South Korea, there is a cultural literary concept called “Han.” It expresses a collective
sentiment of deep pain and oppression, and for many Koreans, it expresses how Korean people
are survivors of unending injustice and persecution. Korea, a country with a long history of 5,000
years, has been invaded by the Chinese, the Mongols, and the Japanese. During the Cold War,
Korea was dominated by the super powers’ competition for spheres of influence, leading to a
divided nation. These tumultuous events affected everyday Koreans to experience oppression
and share a fragmented history. Even after the war, Korea was never truly free. Its political
sphere was filled with more than 30 years of repressive authoritarian regimes, marked by
numerous cases of human rights violations. Today, despite the country’s much-praised
democratic transition, Korea is a nation of unresolved past injustices.
The hotly contested 2012 election of Park Geun-Hye as the sixth democratic president of
South Korea was actually emblematic of its dark, unresolved past. As the daughter of the
infamous dictator Park Chung-Hee, who led the nation with an iron fist from 1963 to 1979, Park
and her road to the presidency posed a great deal of controversy. Although her father was famous
for bringing in rapid industrialization and modernization in the aftermath of the Korean War, he
also maintained a regime marked by numerous forced disappearances, mass killings, and
indefinite imprisonment of innocent victims. During the campaign, lingering memories of the
heydays of economic growth clashed against those of brutality and heinous crimes that her father
and his regime had committed. Park’s election to the presidency recalled painful memories of
iron fists that gripped the nation for nearly 30 years. And yet as a daughter of the infamous
dictator and the nation’s first woman president, it seemed to underscore the consolidation of
South Korea’s democracy based on reconciliation and modernity.
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However, I will argue, these appearances are deceptive. Rather, even after 60 years of
nation building and institutional change, Korea’s democracy is still incomplete because it failed
to reckon with unresolved past injustices. Even though Korea has elected an eleventh president
and a woman at that, and maintains forms of democracy, there are still remains of lingering
impunity questions at the core of the society. A nation’s democracy cannot be fully consolidated
unless its past problems and abuses are amended. As a result, South Korea’s democracy has been
delayed and it is still not fully consolidated.
For some students and scholars who study transitions to democracy, Korea’s unresolved
past injustice presents an interesting puzzle: Why did Korea’s democracy come about during the
late 1980s and not during the early 1950s or the early 1980s? Especially in 1945, during its postcolonialism period, there was a robust consensus favoring the prosecution of its human rights
abusers and collaborators of the Japanese regime. However, as this thesis will demonstrate, this
was soon stopped due to pressure by what game theorists refer to as veto-players. Then again,
after President Park’s assassination in 1979, the window of opportunity opened once more, but it
soon closed again due to the lack of strong leadership and other forces that went against
prosecution of wrongdoers from the Park regime. Time and time again, there were numerous
windows of opportunity in Korea’s history to both initiate rule of law to establish free and fair
elections and correct past injustices, but these windows closed up with repressive and unfair
endings. Thus, impunity is a vicious cycle that has plagued Korea’s modern history for a half
century with forced amnesia of the past.
In this thesis, I will argue that the delay was caused by the path dependent effects and
constraints of decisions to institutionalize impunity. I will demonstrate this by examining two
moments in history to see whether or not Time 1, the moment of independence from Japan in
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1945, set Korea on a limited path to Time 2, the moment after President Park’s assassination,
with limited choices. Did the lack of democratic institutions and accounting systems of
wrongdoers during Time 1 contribute to Time 2? Were there new mechanisms and vehicles
available during Time 2 that Korea was ultimately unable to utilize? Lastly, how were they
similar and different? I hypothesize that by establishing a rule of law to maintain fair and free
election and correct past injustices, these moments could have turned out differently and Korea’s
democracy may have been fully consolidated sooner.

I.

Brief History of Correcting Past Injustice and Democratization

In the twentieth century, there were two watershed moments in countries that faced
colonialism and the Cold War era, including South Korea, to build transitional justice and
democracy: the post-World War II period and post-Cold War period. Specifically, during the
post-World War II period, countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East that had suffered from
colonial repression longed to create their own independent democratic states and resolve with
their past. Immediately preceding this wave of independence, the Nuremberg Trials and Tokyo
Trials were set up to prosecute any political, military, and economic leadership who were
responsible for committing heinous crimes, namely massive killings and use of violent
repression against civilians. The trials underscored the need for accounting for past regimes in
order for these persecuting countries to be readmitted into the community of nations, which is
known today as the United Nations. Eventually, the precedents set from the military tribunals
became an example to rectify past wrongdoings and bring reparation to victims.
However, severe political unrest, social conflict, revolutionary violence, and the clash of
ideologies filled the political vacuum of the post-World War II era. Decolonized nations
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continued to carry the burden of the colonial past and state elites consolidated their power in
political, economic, and social arenas. Decolonization did not lead to democratization. Soon, the
era of the Cold War began and the United States’ Cold War priorities determined U.S. foreign
policy to focus on the promotion of anti-communist governments, often at the expense of its
democratic credentials. In the majority of cases, the work of overcoming colonial legacies and
crafting a new democratic nation remained unfulfilled and left to be tackled by the formerly
colonized states later.
The second period came with the collapse of authoritarianism, military dictatorships, and
the Cold War, mostly in the 1980s. At this moment, the nations that had just escaped from
military dictatorships and totalitarianism were met with political turmoil and unrest in the
transitional period for democracy. Similar to those postcolonial nations that faced past
wrongdoings by their colonial rulers and collaborators, countries that maintained dictatorship
during the Cold War period were also met with a task of dealing with past-wrongdoings of
authoritarian rulers and collaborators. Governmental and non-governmental institutions were
founded in countries— such as the National Commission for Forced Disappearances of
Argentina and South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission — to deal with past
atrocities by seeking truth and reconciliation or by prosecuting the perpetrators. 2
Specifically in South Korea’s case, the first turning point for transitional justice was
during the postcolonial period, 1945 to 1950. After Japanese colonialism ended in Korea, the
main political task was to establish an independent democratic nation-state. The U.S. military
government prosecuted Japanese war criminals through the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, but it failed
2

For Argentina, further information can be found in Ernesto Sabato, "Report of CONADEP: National Commission
on the Disappearance of Persons." El Proyecto Desaparecidos. 1984. Accessed March 26, 2014.
http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_001.htm. For South Africa, see
"Truth and Reconciliation Commission." South Africa Department of Justice. Accessed March 26, 2014.
http://www.justice.gov.za/Trc/index.html.
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to adopt a similar policy in South Korea because the United States saw Koreans as victims of
Japanese annexation, not as enemies of the United States. It was apparent that in order to build a
new nation where justice and democracy flourished, getting rid of Japan’s colonial governance
and prosecuting local collaborators were the priorities. However, U.S. occupational forces
arrested and convicted only a few Koreans who served in the Japanese Army, while those
serving in Japan’s colonial regime were never regarded as criminals and were never punished.
At the same time, demands by the public for the prosecution of Japanese collaborators
were not easily dismissed. To appease public sentiment, the Korean National Assembly passed
the Special Act on Punishing Anti-National Conducts, which created a commission to investigate
and prosecute Japanese collaborators, in November 1948. 3 However, the investigation to correct
historical justice was short-lived. The conservatives often hindered the investigation, and
President Rhee even accused the commission as communists and protested that the Act might be
misused to arrest innocent citizens. The commission ceased to function and it came to an end
within a year without producing promising results. Korea’s transition to democracy came to a
halt as General Park Chung-Hee took over the regime through a military coup in 1961. Park
ruled South Korea for more than 18 years with violent repression aimed at its own citizens and
power concentrated in the executive branch.
The second turning point came in 1979 when President Park was assassinated by the head
of Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). The new interim president, Choi Kyu-Ha, and
his cabinet members firmly believed that the time for democratic transition was ripe. They held
press conferences to inform the public about planning a free and fair election and beginning
constitutional reform. 4 The Choi administration even regularly contacted U.S. officials for
3
4

Dong-Choon Kim, "The Long Road Toward Truth And Reconciliation," Critical Asian Studies 42.4 (2010): 526.
Dong-A Ilbo, December 21, 1979.
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technical advice on political liberalization. However, in a matter of three months after Park’s
assassination, General Chun Doo-Hwan took over the regime by military coup and controlled
interim president Choi Kyu-Ha’s influence.
People’s rage finally exploded at the May 1980 protest against Chun’s dictatorship in
Gwangju. It was a popular uprising by Gwangju residents, mainly students, that ended with
2,000 casualties. 5 Protestors took control over the city and took up arms by raiding police
stations, but they were crushed by the Korean Army. As a result, thousands of cases of torture
and forced disappearances were formed. Then, in 1986, met by the popular demand to oust Chun,
his party, the Democratic Justice Party, announced direct elections.
At this point, South Korea formed a pacted democracy, which is a democracy held
together by an agreement among elite groups of the country to bring about democratic transition
without confronting impunity. 6 The reform group within the South Korean government made an
agreement, and opposition groups accepted it in order to avoid mutual catastrophe. Previously,
opposition parties existed under the Chun regime, but they were merely set up as puppet
organizations that maintained little real legislative power. But with the opening for a democratic
transition, Chun allowed political activities of the opposition parties. Both the reform group, the
New Democratic Republican Group, and the moderate opposition group within the government
and Chun’s ruling party, Democratic Justice Party, felt that a total collapse of government would
not serve their best interests nor those of the country. They agreed to a proposal for the
development of a democratic procedure. Accordingly, South Korea’s democratic transition

5

Kim, op. cit., 536.
Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions
about Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986: 37.

6
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through negotiations and pacts among political elites made it possible to sustain political, social,
and economic structures.
With the strong support of Chun and the vote-splitting of opposition parties between Kim
Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung, Rho Tae-Woo won the 1986 presidential election and took over
the regime. In 1989, giving into the demands of the public to recognize the victims of the protest
movement, Rho passed the Law for Compensating the Victims of the Gwangju Incident, which
compensated the victims without the pursuit of truth and criminal justice. However, although
Roh was elected through a direct public vote, his legitimacy suffered because of his past as a
military general. Also, after beginning the process of democratic transition, the demands of civil
society were not satisfied. The continuously unstable socioeconomic situation derived from
student and labor demonstrations made it difficult for a new democracy to maintain its
efficiency. 7
When President Kim Young-Sam was elected and inaugurated in 1993, he yielded to
public pressure and agreed to sign the Gwangju Special Law. With this, in 1995, Chun was tried
by Seoul District Court and found guilty of staging a military coup in 1979 and ordering a
military crackdown in 1980 that led to the killing of hundreds of anti-government protesters in
Gwangju. Roh Tae-Woo was charged with his role in seizing power and taking bribes from a
number of large conglomerate corporations. Chun was given a death sentence, and Roh a 22 ½
year imprisonment. However, just one year after their convictions, the court reduced their
sentences: Chun’s death sentence to life imprisonment and Roh’s sentence to be reduced to 17
years of imprisonment. In 1997, the then-president Kim Young-Sam and his successor Kim DaeJung agreed to release and give special pardons to Chun and Roh, who were serving their time in
7

Sangmook Lee, "Democratic Transition and the Consolidation of Democracy in South Korea," Taiwan Journal of
Democracy 3rd ser. 3.99-125 (2007): 111.
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prison. 8 In a nationally televised statement, Kim reminded the nation that the special pardon was
carried out “to unite the country’s leadership and reconcile the past to build a new era for this
country.” 9 However, the announcement was met by conflicting responses from Korean nationals,
especially from the Cholla region where Chun ordered a bloody military retaliation that led to
hundreds of casualties. While it is laudable that the Korean Court brought forth a trial to hold
state officials accountable for serious crimes such as mutiny, treason, and bribery, the delayed
prosecution failed to achieve any of its supposed goals of justice. The defendants failed to pay
the full consequences of their wrongdoings, while victims felt that the recognition of their
damages and sufferings was not fully materialized. When a leap towards justice was made, it was
then too late with too little punishment and accounting.
Coming out of this, it is evident that the two watershed moments in South Korea’s
political history lacked truth and reconciliation processes during the mid-1940 to 1980’s. It failed
to head off governmental officials with past war crimes and abuse of human rights and led them
to operate in succeeding regimes, carrying out same abusive tactics as they did in the past and
leading Korea to an illiberal democracy. 10 This institutionalization of impunity made up the rot
at the heart of South Korea’s democracy. This impunity problem exacerbated the political and
social culture drastically and thus, delayed the consolidation of Korea’s democracy.
A significant force delayed Korea’s democratization by turning a blind eye to prosecuting
war criminals and perpetrators of human rights, and to recognizing victims. There were
individuals and institutions, some who had committed crimes, and others who protected

8

David Holley, "Jailed S. Korea Ex-Presidents to Get Pardons," Los Angeles Times, December 20, 1997. Accessed
December 21, 2013. http://articles.latimes.com/1997/dec/20/news/mn-508.
9
Ibid.
10
Illiberal democracy is a term coined by Fareed Zakaria. It is a governing system in which free and fair elections
are held but citizens lack civil liberties and the government fails to represent interest of its own citizens. Fareed
Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs 76.6 (1997): 22. Print.
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wrongdoers from prosecution to enhance their own power. These powers 11 benefitted from the
sordid culture of corruption and its damaging impact on the society. This culture broke down the
rule of law and legitimacy of democratic ideals. Effectively, impunity comes about when there
is a vibrant interaction between veto-players and reformers, and when the veto players prevail,
impunity slows down institutional movement to political liberalization. Thus, this thesis locates
Korea in the spectrum of democratization process and identifies veto-players, who were key
actors that kept Korea on the “impunity” path.

II.

Research Procedure

The main puzzle that this thesis focuses on is: Why did it take so long for South Korea to
build itself as a democratic nation? My answer comes in three parts: first, identifying the
processes that delayed democratization – particularly, the institutionalization of impunity – and
second, identifying the forces that explain how and why impunity got institutionalized – which
were both internal and external. Finally, I demonstrate the causal connection between impunity
and delayed democratization.
I have made use of a variety of conceptual tools to construct this answer.

12

In the next

section of this chapter, I will develop three interrelated concepts: path dependency, process
tracing, and critical junctures; in the following section I add the concept of veto players (both
internal and external) to explain the mechanisms by which impunity becomes institutionalized.

11

In this thesis, they are identified as veto-players.
Applying a variety of theoretical frameworks to illustrate a case has proven to be a productive approach in this
thesis. It has allowed me to identify limits to making generalizations about veto-players who benefitted from
impunity, while helping me to understand that there were other key variables in achieving a full, legitimate
democracy. "Theoretical Framework," USC Libraries. University of Southern California, n.d. Web. Accessed
December 19, 2013. http://libguides.usc.edu/content.php?pid=83009.
12
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In the final section, I examine the concepts of impunity and transitional justice, and make the
connection to delayed democratization.

Process Tracing and Critical Junctures
I first began the research by using a method of constructing detailed chronologies of
trajectories. Then utilizing “process tracing,” I plotted events chronologically with detailed
summaries to see how a certain outcome came about due to the convergence of several
conditions, causal chains, and independent variables. 13 Then I looked at how certain “putative
causes” can be linked to “observed effects” in a given time frame. That is to say “of the two
kinds of evidence on the theoretical causal notions of causal effect and causal mechanisms, tests
of covariation attempt to address the former, and process tracing assesses the latter.” 14
As a result of this process tracing method, I identified two moments— the late 1940s and
the late 1970s/early 1980s— as critical junctures when Korea might have had the opportunity to
go off the path of impunity, but ultimately was unable to take that new path. First, especially
during the postcolonial period from 1945 to 1950, the window of opportunity to bring proJapanese collaborators to justice and reconcile the past had opened up. President Rhee even
passed the Special Act on Punishing Anti-National Conducts that set up a commission to
investigate and punish the collaborators.

15

However, the chance to bring justice and

reconciliation soon came to a halt when the commission was terminated without solid results due
to the attacks from the conservatives. Then again in 1979, when President Park was assassinated
13

Alexander L. George, and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005: 1.
14
Andrew Bennett and Alexander George, “Process Tracing in Case Study Research,” paper presented at the
MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
(BCSIA), Harvard University, October 17-19, 1997. Accessed December 20, 2013.
http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kritzer/teaching/ps816/ProcessTracing.htm. Emphasis mine.
15
Kim, op. cit., 530.
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and Koreans were hoping for an institutional regime change to a liberal government after
decades of repressive iron fist, the window had opened up again this time for the “Seoul
Spring.” 16 However, the acting president Choi Kyu-Ha, who quickly worked to bring a smooth
transition to democracy, failed in his pursuit when General Chun initiated a military coup and
took over, forcing President Choi to resign from his post. Again, the opportunity to punish
violators of human rights from the previous regime had been missed and the path to dictatorship
gripped itself again in Korea.
These two key moments became critical junctures, which led me to closely examine the
openings of these times. According to Lipset and Rokkan, a critical juncture is a “watershed
moment in which different transitions lead to certain directions of change and foreclose others in
a way that shapes politics for years to come.” 17 It is also a central element of path dependency
analysis, which has become a key tool in comparative politics to make sense of the impact of the
past on political processes and institutions. Critical junctures have three components: the claim
that a significant change has occurred, the claim that this change took place in distinct ways in
different cases, and the explanatory hypothesis about its consequences. 18 In order to identify a
critical juncture, political scientists look at how antecedent conditions with contingent choices
lead to setting up specific trajectory of institutional development and consolidation that is
difficult to reverse. I looked at how these critical times contributed to “path dependency”—
reflecting how the decisions made during this time limited the trajectory of the future. Studying
these two defining moments offered this thesis the spectrum of choices and decisions made by
the state and powerful social actors that shaped South Korea’s road to democracy.
16

Korean democracy scholars refer to this brief moment of democratization as the “Seoul Spring.” For more on this
moment, see the case study in Chapter 3, below.
17
Ruth Collier, and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and
Regime Dynamics in Latin America, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991: 27.
18
Ibid., p. 30.
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Veto-Players and the Impunity Path
In this section, I am going to discuss veto-players and the impunity path, which is the
second part of my three-part argument. As put forward by leading game theorist George Tsebelis,
veto-players are individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the
status quo. Such a change in status quo requires a unanimous decision of all veto-players. 19 In
this thesis, the status quo is the institution of impunity, and a change in the status quo would be
institutional change to democratization through vehicles such as bringing justice and reconciling
the past. Veto-players are the individuals or groups of people who firmly maintained control
of— or more precisely, hindered the impact of— the aforementioned vehicles. Veto-players are
crucial to this thesis because their activities can determine a country’s path dependency. Since
institutions are hard to change and slow to self-examination, a veto-player’s choice of action can
either limit or adamantly close openings for rectification. Thus, I hypothesize that impunity at
Time 1 makes it more difficult to face it at Time 2.
Veto-players could be anyone or any group from the presidents to the military that
extended a certain degree of impunity to maintain their hold of power and legitimacy. In this
thesis, it will be politicians, the military and external powers. While the United States had played
a major role in shaping Korean politics through pressure and coercion, there are other vetoplayers within Korean society that defended their own privileges and power. In order to closely
examine the relationships and the dynamic of the veto-players, I am going to delve into
telegrams among U.S. officials, newspaper articles during the time, and declassified archives of
internal memos within the government. Also, it is crucial to investigate veto-players and
impunity by asking following questions about each era:

19

George Tsebelis, Veto Players How Political Institutions Work, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011: 9.
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1) Who were the veto-players?
2) When and how was impunity created?
3) What was veto-players’ modus operandi?
4) Who benefitted?
5) What kind of defense was maintained to privilege others?
6) What was the cost and implication of their actions?

Impunity as the Rot that Decays Democracy and Delays Democratization
a) What is Impunity and Why Does it Matter?
In the process of preserving their veto-power, some of the players institutionalized impunity
and became a rot to the Korean society that hindered the process of democratization. After
specifically identifying the veto-players, the thesis investigates veto-players’ impunity and its
functions, finding out whether or not it worsened and/or expanded to other areas. But before
doing this, I need to establish conceptually, legally, and politically why impunity matters.
According to the Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights
Through Action to Combat Impunity, submitted to the United Nations Commission of Human
Rights:
Impunity is the impossibility of bringing the perpetrators of violations to account –
whether in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings. Impunity arises
from a failure by States to meet their obligations to investigate violations; to take
appropriate measures in respect of the perpetrators, particularly in the area of justice, by
ensuring that those suspected of criminal responsibility are prosecuted, tried and duly
punished; to provide victims with effective remedies and to ensure that they receive
reparation for the injuries suffered; to ensure the inalienable right to know the truth about
violations; and to take other necessary steps to prevent a recurrence of violations. 20

20

"Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat
Impunity." United Nations. United Nations: Commission on Human Rights, 8 Feb. 2005. Web. Accessed January 4,
2014. http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.sub.2.1997.20.Rev.1.En.
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Likewise, impunity causes a broader societal rot that damages the core of democracy. Fighting
against impunity is a significant battle in fixing a culture of violence, corruption, and oppression.
As Woody writes, “failure to control the trend of impunity can have grave consequences for a
newly developed government and can pose myriad setbacks and limitations to future evolution of
the state.” 21 Specifically, when there is a continuity of impunity in government, citizens are
prone to lose faith in the new state and believe that the “old ways” will continue to prevail in the
new state. I argue that past regime officials must be held accountable to the point where no
impunity is possible and “rule of law becomes the only game in town” even during political and
economic crisis. 22 The institution of impunity must be directly faced and resolved as a nation
transitions into a consolidated democracy. This idea is known as “transitional justice,” which
refers to the “set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been implemented by different
countries in order to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses. These measures
include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, and various kinds of
institutional reforms.” 23

b) Transitional Justice: No Transition without (Legal) Justice?
Over the years, transitional justice has taken shape in multifaceted forms. The basic
question of how to reckon with massive past crimes and abuses raises a range of approaches as a
new regime emerges in pursuit of peace and democracy. 24 There are numerous mechanisms and
instruments to deal with the past: holding trials; purging perpetrators from public or security
21

Katherine Woody, Truth and Justice: The Role of Truth Commissions in Post-Conflict Societies, Working paper,
Report prepared for Law of Nationbuilding Seminar. Chicago: IIT Chicago - Kent College of Law, 2009. Print.
22
Juan Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies," Journal of Democracy 7.2 (1996): 14.
23
"International Center for Transitional Justice." ICTJ. International Center for Transitional Justice. Accessed
February 27, 2014. http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice
24
San Wook Daniel Han, "Transitional Justice: When Justice Strikes Back - Case Studies of Delayed Justice in
Argentina and South Korea," Houston Journal of International Law 30.3 (2008): 6.
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posts; creating commission of inquiry; providing individualized access to security files;
providing reparation to victims; building memorials; implementing military, police, judicial, or
reforms. 25 In this thesis, I am going to focus on criminal justice, i.e., the need for bringing
justice in the courts by prosecuting former human rights abusers.
One of the main debates in transitional justice has been about whether or not a new
regime should punish human rights abusers from the past regime after a recent transition to a
new democratic regime. 26 Bringing justice in the courts is among the most difficult and
prominent demands. Critics argue that bringing justice may exacerbate the new regime’s political
instability, and thus may lead to possible military coup by the opposition. However, without
clear and flexible prosecutions after a transition, a new emerging regime will suffer from the rot
caused by those who operate above the law and maintain firm hold of decision-making in the
political arena. Holding those human rights abusers accountable promotes the new regime’s rule
of law and creates legitimacy of its governance. It should be one of the first priorities for a
regime that pursues peace and democracy. While it is said that “justice delayed is justice denied,”
it is better late than never. Justice often comes slowly and it is an on-going process that needs to
be continued for a period of time. Still, bringing justice soon after transition sheds light on harsh
devastations that defendants had faced and allows the public to be informed about the nature of
the state.
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In order to talk about different cases of transitional justice, it is imperative to talk about
what transitional justice is as a mechanism. According to Jon Elster, there are three forms of
justice under transitional justice: political justice, administrative justice, and legal justice. 27
Political justice occurs when the executive branch of the government unilaterally decides
what should be done with wrongdoers. It takes the form of show trials, where in a highly public
trial judicial officers have already determined the guilt of the defendant. Administrative justice is
allowing officials who are purged to have the benefit of due process. Legal justice, the form that
should be given the highest consideration, is characterized by four features. First, the laws should
be as unambiguous as possible, to reduce the scope for judicial interpretation. Second, the
judiciary should be insulated from the other branches of government. Third, judges and jurors
should be unbiased when interpreting the law. They should not distort the meaning of the law to
justify a decision they have already reached. Fourth, legal justice must adhere to the principles of
due process: the right to choose one’s own lawyer, the right to appeal, respect for statute of
limitations, determination of individual guilt, and a presumption of innocence that places the
burden of proof on the prosecution. 28 Each of these features is instrumental in eliminating the rot
of impunity and in claiming back citizens’ faith in the rule of law and in democracy. Hence, this
thesis advocates for legal justice in the course of any transitional justice.
Applying the concept of legal justice, trials must be carried out in a way that adheres to
both legitimacy (procedural fairness) and distributive justice (substantive fairness). For a system
to be fair:
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“… it must be firmly rooted in a framework of formal requirements about how rules are
made, interpreted and applied. Among the marks of legitimacy are the determinacy of the
legal rules, their symbolic validation through the possession of attributes that mark them
out as authoritative, their application in a coherent manner that treat ‘like cases alike’ and
their adherence to secondary rules that govern the creation, interpretation and application
of such rules.” 29
It must move beyond the political realm, and ground the proceedings in objectively fair standards,
which promotes due process and freedom from the fear of arbitrary punishment. 30 In terms of
punishment for defendants, retributive justice should be carried out in a way that punishment fits
the crime and that like cases are treated alike. Wrongdoers deserve blame and punishment in
direct proportion to the harm inflicted. However, overly harsh punishments do not make society
any more secure and serve to increase the level of harm done. Punishment is thought to reinforce
the rules of international law and to deny those who have violated those rules any unfair
advantages. There is a need to give wrongdoers what they deserve, but in a way that avoids
further escalation of the conflict— allowing formal institutions with trained judiciaries to carry
out just retribution. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is one avenue of retributive justice to
“transfer the responsibilities for apportioning blame and punishment from victims to public
bodies acting according to the rule of law.” 31
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c) “Delayed” Democratization: Defining Transition and Consolidation, or, What Counts
as ‘Democracy’?
In each of the case studies in this thesis, a given era will be located on the spectrum of
democracies. It will start with the political and socioeconomic context of that era and delve into
what type of democracy the government was operating. Thus, it is crucial to clarify and
crystallize theories on democracy and democratization.
Democratization, at a minimum, involves holding free elections on a regular basis and
determining who governs on the basis of the results. 32 It also involves bring an end to an
undemocratic regime, the inception of a democratic regime, and then the consolidation of a
democratic system. Many scholars contributing to this literature view the transition phase of
democratization as a period of great uncertainty. This phase entails a new democratic set of rules
for political life. The end of the period of democratic transition becomes successful when a new
democracy establishes a new constitution and holds free elections for political leaders with few
barriers to participation. 33 After a successful democratic transition, the task of the consolidation
of democracy becomes next in order. This linear process, democratic transition through election
and towards consolidation of democracy, has been part of an on-going debate as to what
constitutes a consolidated democracy. Thus, I argue that a nation’s democracy cannot be fully
consolidated unless its past problems and abuses are amended.
On the whole, there are two conceptions of democracy. 34 One is a minimalist conception
that emphasizes procedural or formal democracy. Procedural democracy is evident when a new
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democratic regime elects political leaders through a free and fair election and maintains vibrant
party competition, yet its citizens and the civil society fail to influence the policies of the country.
Schmitter defines this minimalist conception as “the process of transforming the accidental
arrangements, prudential norms, and contingent solutions that have emerged during the transition
into relations of cooperation and competition that are reliably known, regularly practiced, and
voluntarily accepted by those persons or collectives that participate in democratic governance.” 35
Linz and Stepan also mention that “none of the major political actors, parties, or organized
interests, forces, or institutions considers that there is any alternative to the democratic process to
gain power and that no political institutions or groups have a claim to veto the action of
democratically elected decision makers… To put it simply, democracy must be seen as the only
game in town.” 36
The other is a maximalist conception focusing on the outcomes of politics such as social
justice, economic equality, or establishing political institutions. Scholars favoring the maximalist
conception argue that both political and socioeconomic equality are needed for a country’s
democracy to be consolidated. Such a democracy would include both procedural and substantive
democracy elements such as “guarantees of civil rights, democratic accountability, civilian
control over the military, democratic and constitutional checks on executive authority, and
punishment of occupational and human rights abuses.” 37
Because of the influence of his work The Third Wave, I am going to use Samuel
Huntington’s definitions of democracy as a litmus test to classify and identify a democratic
regime. According to Huntington, the definition of democracy in relation to free and fair
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elections is a minimal definition. A society could choose its political leaders but they do not
exercise real power. True democracy, which aligns to the maximalist definition, means citizen
control over policy, responsible government, honesty and openness in politics, informed and
rational deliberation, equal participation, and promotion of civil and political rights. 38 Political
leaders share power with other groups in society. Lastly, nondemocratic regimes do not have
electoral competition and widespread voting participation. 39
In order to investigate South Korea’s case of democracy and how it has been affected by
veto-players, in this phase of the analysis I will examine the transparency level of Korean
governmental institutions, distribution of power among the judicial, executive, and legislative
branches, and the level of autonomy by presidency. I will also study scholarly analysis on
political institutions including both governmental agencies and the office of Korea president, and
reports by Truth and Reconciliation of South Korea.

III.

Contribution to the Literature on Democratization

a) Confronting Impunity Is Beneficial, Not Threatening, to Democratization
In this thesis I argue that the process of digging out the past and prosecuting
wrongdoers— specifically those who benefitted from impunity and human rights violators— is a
crucial step in transitional justice, and that this process fosters democratization. As I will
examine in Chapter 1, scholarship on the need for prosecution has been polarizing over the years,
but after the end of the Cold War, a new consensus has emerged favoring prosecution as a
necessary part of transitional justice.
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First-generation “transitologists,” writing in the 1970s and 1980s, stand against my
aforementioned argument and generally conclude that prosecution of past violations is likely to
destabilize new democracies. Huntington, a frontrunner of this general literature in academic and
policy circles, believed that truth as well as justice were threats to new democracies, and
prosecuting authoritarian officials for human rights violations would incur political costs that
would outweigh any moral gains. 40 His credibility not only carried a huge weight to the next
generation of transitology scholars but also reinforced the scholars of previous generations. In
their 1986 report Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain
Democracies, leading transitologists Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter do
acknowledge the need to investigate violations of human rights, but suggest that in most
transitional countries, holding trials would be very difficult. They write, “[only] if civilian
politicians use courage and skill, it may not necessarily be suicidal for a nascent democracy to
confront the most reprehensible facts of its recent past.” 41 Also, as scholars were coming
together with this shared belief in the 1980’s, even Aryeh Neier, executive director of Human
Rights Watch at the time, was pessimistic regarding prosecution. It was a big blow to the human
rights community because as an activist, Neier has led multiple investigations of human rights
around the world. He wrote that “permitting the armed forces to make themselves immune to
prosecution for dreadful crimes seems intolerable… yet it also seems irrational to insist that an
elected civilian government should commit suicide by provoking its armed forces.” 42
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Even in more recent years, this shared belief is still maintained by many scholars. Many
scholars of international relations and international law have been critical of the increasing use of
international human rights prosecution. For example, Stephen Krasner, one of the leading voices
in this critique, writes in a New York Times Op-Ed piece that “attempts to bring even the leader
of an abhorrent regime to trial could make it more difficult to promote democracy by making
such leaders and their accomplices more desperate to maintain their hold on power.” 43 In
addition, Jack Snyder, another leading realist scholar, and his co-author Leslie Vinjamuri also
argue that on the basis of thirty-two cases of transitioning countries, human rights trials can
increase the likelihood of future atrocities, exacerbate conflict, and undermine efforts to build
democracy. 44
At the same time, there is a long counter-tradition favoring trials. Political theorist Judith
Shklar writes, “trials may actually serve liberal ends, where they promote legalistic values in
such a way as to contribute to constitutional politics and to a decent legal system.” 45 Similarly,
Otto Kirchheimer of the Frankfurt School believed that trials enable “the construction of a
permanent, unmistakable, wall between the new beginnings and the old tyranny.” 46 Currently,
with the increasing number of transitioning countries that carry out prosecution of its past
violators, there is a growing body of scholarly literature that puts significance in the law during a
transitioning process. Ruti G. Teitel, a comparative law professor at New York Law School,
writes “criminal justice offers normative legalism that helps to bridge periods of diminished rule
of law and offers a way to express both public condemnation of past violence and the
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legitimation of the rule of law necessary to the consolidation of future democracy.” 47 While there
is a caveat of risk of perpetuating political injustice, Teitel argues that criminal justice offers the
fulfillment of the potential for a renewed adherence to the rule of law. 48 Thus, though there are
risks of trials, she strongly argues for the use of strong legal mechanisms to address the past.
More recently, leading international relations scholar Kathryn Sikkink asserts that
nowadays, we see a norm — what she calls the justice cascade— that state officials should be
accountable for human rights violations and that it has gained new strength and legitimacy. 49
Based on her quantitative work on Latin American countries focusing on the relationship
between the countries that underwent transition and the countries that carried out prosecution of
past violators, she writes that it is difficult to maintain that prosecutions destabilize democracy.
Rather, she concludes that there is a strong correlation that those countries that prosecuted its
past wrongdoers will more likely to have forms of democracy. 50 My thesis will closely align with
this argument favoring prosecution as necessary for democratic consolidation, and contribute to
this ongoing debate.

b) Korea’s Democratization: Civil Society Moved Transitions, but Veto Players Halted
Consolidation and Maintained Impunity
In the field of South Korean democracy and South Korea’s modern history, literatures
that argue for causes of successful democratization tend to focus not on transitional justice, but
rather on the role played by contentious politics, specifically social movements 51 of students,
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labor activists, and church leaders. In contrast to the established literature, this thesis will
acknowledge the role that civil society played to bring about free and fair election but also point
out how it failed to unseat the veto-players who kept impunity entrenched. For example, David
Adesnik and Sunhyuk Kim argue that one of the main causes of Korea’s successful
democratization in 1989 and not in 1979 was the increased unity of the protest movement. 52 Hae
Gu Jung and Ho Ki Kim, scholars at Stanford’s Asia-Pacific Research Center, also write that the
“explosive growth of the protest movement led to a series of important events in 1985, which
symbolized the democratization movement of the 1980s.” 53 The protest movements in both
instances consisted of four constituent groups— students, labor unions, churches, and the
parliamentary oppositions. 54 In the 1979 movement, they never achieved sufficient solidarity.
But in 1987, the movement’s constituents successfully formed and operated peak organizations
to consolidate and plan various protests.
The representatives of civil society, such as Catholic Priests’ Association for Justice,
intellectual groups such as the Council of Dismissed Professors, human rights organizations like
the Korean Council for the Human Rights Movement, and writers’ groups like the Council of
Writers for Practicing Freedom, enjoyed a cooperative relationship with the political opposition,
especially the New Democratic Party with the leadership of Kim Young-Sam. 55 However,
Adesnik and Kim argue that the cooperation between civil society and political sphere was not
through institutionalized channels but through the close relationship between religious leaders
and politicians from the opposition party. Also, the students and labor unions maintained strong
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ties with religious organizations. Sunhyuk Kim wrote “the church soon became a guardian of
young full-time dissidents, mostly composed of expelled students from colleges and universities,
and a care provider for labor activists.” 56 The churches and the unions came together under the
groups such as the Young Catholic Workers and the Urban Industrial Mission. Students
interacted with workers in settings such as the “night schools” that the students set up near
factory towns. Night schools were first established to satisfy laborers’ desires higher education.
Over time, schools’ purpose shifted to consciousness-raising programs tailored to the laborers.
All together, the movement constituted a triple solidarity of students, laborers, and churches. 57
With the growing support and the establishment of the triple solidarity, the movement came
together in a new peak organization called the National Movement Headquarters for Democratic
Change. In 1987, this largely connected coalition organized several massive protests, including
the June 26 Peace Parade that mobilized about one million protesters throughout South Korea. 58
Three days after the Peace Parade, Chun Doo-Hwan announced that the government would
surrender to the movements’ demands.
On the other hand, historical literatures on Korea’s previously failed attempts to
democratize focus on different interests and ambitions by presidents, public sentiment, and
conflicts that distracted the United States from closely intervening in South Korea. James Fowler
argued that from 1979 to 1981, the period in which Carter maintained the presidency, the United
States was conspicuously silent, and some scholars see this as a crucial reason that the transition
failed. 59
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Likewise, there are relatively few scholars who focus on transitional justice, specifically
prosecution of past violators, as a crucial process for South Korea’s democratization. One such
scholar, Sang-Wook Han, agreed that South Korea had delayed justice, but argued that by
delaying justice, a country could overcome or sufficiently build up civil society to absorb several
risks that immediate prosecution poses to reconciliation. 60 Han held up South Korea as a
successful example of a delayed justice nation, where after 60 years from the independence,
South Korea is now able to bring justice to those human rights violators. However, I agree with
Huntington’s warning that if trials were undertaken, they have to be carried out immediately
after the transition or it would be impossible.61 Seeking justice through prosecution after decades
of nothingness is a very difficult, perhaps futile process. South Korea’s truth and reconciliation
commission, which was established in 2005, is currently at a halt due to the lack of political
support from the National Assembly and public funding. Also, from its inception, it had no
jurisdiction for bringing justice through prosecution. Besides President Roh Moo-Hyun’s public
apology on massacres that occurred during the 1980’s and passing the law to investigate those
pro-Japanese collaborators, South Korea’s truth and reconciliation commission ended without
much investigation of the past or prosecution of wrongdoers. Han also fails to connect how
justice, delayed or not, contributed to Korea’s democratic consolidation. Therefore, my thesis,
which argues that prosecuting past human rights violators is a necessary step to democratization,
sheds new light on the field of transitional justice and Korea’s democratic transition.
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IV.

Structure of the Argument
In Chapter 1, I will delve into why prosecution is an imperative process in post-conflict

societies, and I will break down implications that legal prosecution hold for the society.
Examples from Guatemala, Cambodia, and Argentina will illustrate the limitations that
institutional impunity presents and why prosecution is an effective means to achieve national
reconciliation and to challenge impunity. This will be followed by three case study chapters on
South Korea, respectively the 1940s, 1980s, and present, in which I will present my path
dependency-based analysis of three critical junctures in Korea’s democratization process. Here I
will use process tracing to identify veto players, and examine available transitional justice
mechanisms and the consequences of not using them. Finally, I will present a conclusion chapter
that will contain comparative analysis to make the case for reconciling the nation by facing the
past and establishing justice.
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CHAPTER 1: CASES FOR PROSECUTION
Introduction: Why Legal Justice Matters for Democratization
In this chapter, I am going to first delve into procedures of legal prosecution and explore
three illustrative cases from Guatemala, Cambodia, and Argentina to closely study why
prosecution is one of the most effective processes for nations to reconcile with the past. Societies
face the past in several different forms— whether by granting amnesty, purging, or
prosecution— but only by legal prosecution, victims are fully recognized and defendants face the
consequences of their actions. As legal scholar Diane Orentlicher writes, “Prosecution is the
most effective insurance against future repression.” Prosecution, she contends, demonstrates that
no one is above the law, thus it fosters respect for democratic institutions and deepens a society’s
ongoing democratic culture. 62 Furthermore, by revealing the truth about the violations of the past
and punishing them, it deters future lawbreakers and prevents the public from being tempted to
be part of state-sponsored impunity. 63 Finally, governments should prosecute their predecessors’
atrocious crimes because trials legitimate a nation’s transition to democracy. Specifically, when a
government prosecutes military officers for human rights abuse, it affirms the supremacy of
publicly accountable civilian institutions.64
Prosecution also strengthens fragile democracies because the rule of law is integral to
democracy itself. 65 According to democracy theorist Robert Dahl, political culture that supports
stable democracies is prone to value and maintain principles of fairness, legality and due process.
He also adds that extensive political rights and liberties [prosecution and justice] are integral to
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democracy and the functioning of the institutions that distinguish modern democracy from other
kinds of political orders. 66 Though political rights and economic rights may vary from country
to country, he acknowledges the fact that democratic nations tend to value human rights and thus,
maintain high order of the rule of law.
While legal prosecution is a long and complicated process, it demonstrates that no one is
above or outside the law. As Aristotle said, “The rule of law is better than that of any individual,”
as it provides an arena where individuals, both the accused and the accuser, are protected by the
law and legal procedures. 67 Similarly, as legal scholar Martha Minow suggests, applying the rule
of law to prosecute those involved in mass atrocities is a very sacred process that aims to be
insulated from the influence of politics, personal biases, and personal grudge and revenge. When
done properly, it can establish judicial institutions where rule of law can be exercised. Thus, for
new democracies, a nation’s judiciary and respect for the constitution, more than elections, must
be given special attention. Trials not only call for accountability and present evidence of harms
done but also reparative punishment. 68 After evidence is closely examined and laws are applied,
defendants are given a verdict, a sentence. Victims have a sense of accounting for truth and
peace. This process affirms that justice has been done and establishes precedents that there will
be consequences for not obeying the law.
Any prosecution of individuals for war crimes and domestic mass atrocities borrows from
the norms and precedents set by the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials conducted after World War II.69
These postwar trials helped to launch an international norm for human rights – the Universal
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Declaration of Human Rights - and to establish a body that maintains such rights – the United
Nations. There are several examples of domestic prosecutions that were inspired by the
Nuremberg Trials: Israel’s prosecution of Adolph Eichmann, Argentina’s prosecution of 500
members of the military junta involved in state terrorism, and Poland’s trial of General Jaruzelski
for his imposition of martial law. 70
Despite these precedents, societies with historical injustice often do not prosecute. As an
alternative to prosecution, granting amnesty to wrongdoers is frequently employed as a political
and economic response to deal with the past. Often times, it is a decision to protect a burgeoning
democratic regime. Scholars of democratization have argued that prosecution of wrongdoers
from the previous regime may exacerbate conflict and push military leaders to forcefully take
over the government. 71 Also, amnesty is granted when the new governmental body lacks
political power and freedom to investigate and prosecute. However, the harmful effects of
impunity are especially apparent when prosecutions are foreclosed by an amnesty law to appease
the military or autonomous bodies. There are clear examples that show unwillingness to
prosecute brings detrimental collateral damage to not only victims of conflicts but also all
citizens, and society at large. It is particularly clear in the cases of Guatemala, Cambodia, and
Argentina.
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Guatemala
In Guatemala, 36 years of domestic conflict ended in 1996 after 40,000 enforced
disappearances and 200,000 deaths. 72 In the aftermath, both the government and the opposition
agreed to set up a truth commission, but with a body that had limited judicial power. 73 The UNsupported International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) was also set up to
investigate abuses and raise awareness on impunity and organized crime in the country 74 .
Recently, it has been lauded by the UN community for pushing for constitutional reform to allow
independent judicial branch in Guatemala, but the work of the CICIG is still limited due to the
constraint in judicial independence and the lack of transparency by the Guatemalan
government. 75 Without recognizing the victims and accounting of perpetrators, the civilians and
military personnel who were part of mass killing maintained power in the government. The
individuals who maintained impunity during the conflict carried out the same generalized
attitudes and actions of corruption, self-dealing, and hubris towards the new authorities of law.
Former military leaders got involved with drug and human trafficking with criminal gangs. They
perpetuated the culture of violence and false authority in the new Guatemalan State. With this,
networks of violent, criminal enterprises such as drug cartels and criminal gangs carried out
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criminal activities with complete disregard to the rule of law and used violence against law
enforcement. 76
In the recent years, Guatemala’s former dictator Gen. Efrain Rios Montt, a commander in
chief responsible for massacres and forced displacement of the Maya-Ixil during his rule, was
put on trial and convicted of crimes against humanity and received an 80-year prison term. 77
However, although human rights groups in Guatemala were optimistic that the court would stand
defiant and no longer allow impunity for the country’s powerful, Guatemala’s Constitutional
Court overturned his conviction just weeks after his sentencing. 78 In the end, the Guatemala
example portrays a nation tolerating wrongdoers’ long standing impunity and failing to hold
violent individuals accountable to the rule of law.

Cambodia
In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge, an insurgent Communist group, took control over the
capital city, Phnom Penh in April, 1975. This marked the beginning of the Cambodian Genocide,
in which the party enforced arbitrary executions and torture without due process and its attempts
at agricultural reform led to devastating famine. During the four years of the Khmer Rouge’s
repressive and authoritarian domination, about 1.5 to 3 million Cambodians died due to
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overwork, starvation, and state-sponsored murder. 79 The regime infiltrated and attacked groups
that it saw as a threat to its power, primarily officials of the previous regime, ethnic minorities,
college students, and scholars.
While largely ignored by the international community, Cambodia saw a breakthrough to
liberation when Vietnam intervened and invaded the country. The Khmer Rouge was removed
from power in 1979 and was replaced by moderate pro-Vietnamese Communists. However, with
support from China and Thailand, the Khmer Rouge remained active in some parts of
Cambodia’s rural provinces and formed a coalition with resistance forces, which created a
government in exile from bases in Thailand. Their resistance continued into the 1990s until five
permanent members of the UN Security Council facilitated peace negotiations. 80
The Paris Agreements, signed in October of 1991, brought together four factions,
including the Khmer Rouge, to negotiate a peaceful transition and fair governance of Cambodia.
As a result, because it maintained popular support from the rural regions and diplomatic support
from China, the Khmer Rouge kept its political status. The United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) intervened to establish free and fair elections and stabilize
governmental bodies. 81 The Chinese government, which had aided and trained the Khmer Rouge
during the civil war to help replicate China’s communism, refrained from going for the
prosecution route and a choice was made to re-integrate former members of Khmer Rouge into
Cambodian society at large. 82 UNTAC, deprived of judicial power to prosecute, failed to
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comprehensively investigate and try those who were responsible for gross human rights abuses
under the Khmer Rouge. 83
As a result, those who were part of the Khmer Rouge were installed in the new
government. The government offered amnesty and positions in the Royal Cambodian Armed
Forces to Khmer Rouge guerillas who continued low level warfare in the rural provinces.
Eventually, thousands of Khmer Rouge soldiers and generals became rehabilitated without any
punitive measures or purging. In fact, in 1996, the government granted amnesty to Ieng Sary, the
Khmer Rouge’s right hand man who was responsible for planning and operating mass killings.84
He accepted immunity in exchange for promising to promote peace between the Khmer Rouge
guerillas and the government.
In the short term, amnesty is about expedience, transitioning into a quick, seemingly
nonviolent peace, but in the long term, it leaves out confronting the past and impunity can be felt
throughout the society. Today, Cambodian society is still reconciling with trauma and
devastation of the past. A generation of war, revolution, and systematic atrocities committed by
the Khmer Rouge created a fragile society susceptible to corruption and impunity, while
Cambodians became cynical of its tumultuous government. It has hampered nation-building
efforts and held back economic and social development. According to a 2007 report by
LICADHO, a major human rights organization in Cambodia, impunity was the “single most
important area in which the country needs to make progress.” 85 Cambodia, the report asserted,
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continued to persecute political opponents and critics of the government, perpetuates impunity
for state actors, and protects economic interests of the rich and powerful.
Today, Cambodia holds the Cambodia Tribunal, known as the Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), which is a hybrid court between the Cambodian and
international courts that consist of foreign judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. 86 It seeks
to put former Khmer Rouge leaders who committed human rights abuse on trials to find peace
and justice. While the war ended in 1998 and the tribunal was first implemented in 2007 with the
help of UN’s assistance, some Cambodians are still disappointed by the delayed responses of the
Cambodian court. 87 For example, Ieng Sary’s death while waiting for his conviction revealed the
court’s failure to deliver immediate accountability to Khmer Rouge atrocities. Critics would
contend that justice delayed is justice denied.
There is a continued feeling of delayed justice and an untold past. Several scholars today
argue that finding justice for Cambodian victims is integral to the peace-building process in
Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge Tribunal, which was established in 1997, produced few
achievements due to its poor tribunal design and the challenges of the trials. 88 Yet, justice has
revealed itself to be a fundamental element in healing the victims’ trauma, bringing
reconciliation, and building peace in Cambodia. 89 A nationwide population-based survey
conducted in December 2010 by the Human Rights Center at the University of California86
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Berkeley reported that 82.9% still felt hatred toward the Khmer Rouge, while 71.5% wanted
those criminals to be physically tortured. 90 Also, in another survey on Cambodian victims’
opinions on justice and national reconciliation by the Center for Social Development, before the
trial on Khmer Rouge leaders took place, the majority of the victims had reported that they
would feel justice if those who were part of the Khmer Rouge would be prosecuted. 91
Accordingly, there is a general consensus among scholars, based on reports and surveys on the
victims, that justice would be served for the victims if the perpetrators would be tried; otherwise
victims will continue to live in trauma and misery.

Argentina
Finally, in contrast to Guatemala and Cambodia, Argentina faced first prosecutions, then
amnesty and then prosecution again after military repression. Despite presidential pardons to
military generals who had committed human rights abuses, the nation came back to prosecuting
military leaders after 20 years of constant push by human rights groups and victims’ families.
Argentina presents an interesting transitional justice story to the world that prosecution in a
timely manner is one of the best tools, after all, to deal with past crimes.
With the recent and ongoing success in the prosecution of human rights crimes, it is
evident that Argentina has one of the best records of utilizing prosecution as transitional justice
in the world. In the 1970’s, political repression led to massive numbers of deaths, prolonged
arbitrary arrests, disappearances, unfair trials, and pervasive torture. As the commanders-in-chief
of Argentina’s three armed forces ousted President Isabel Peron in 1976, the military proclaimed
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a de facto regime. Under their control, they practiced forced disappearances as the most
notorious feature of repression, and an estimated 30,000 people were abducted by security
forces. 92 They were sent to secret detention centers, where they were inhumanely tortured and
interrogated. Many of them were systematically and secretly murdered. In 1983, before
democracy was restored, the military regime granted itself immunity from any prosecution and
destroyed any documents relevant to the military’s repression.
Raul Alfonsin, Argentina’s first democratically elected president after military rule,
started his presidency with a weak democratic structure and a strong military that avoided any
accountability. Nonetheless, he created a National Commission on Disappeared Persons
(CONADEP) to investigate these crimes. 93 In its 1983 report, Nunca Más (“Never Again”), it
listed numbers of victims and detention centers where individuals were murdered and tortured
under the authority of the armed forces. In 1985, nine former members of the military juntas that
were charged with human rights abuse were successfully prosecuted in a major landmark trial.
The trials began just 18 months after the military government left power and led to the
conviction of former presidents Jorge Rafael Videla, and Roberto Eduardo Viola, the Admirals
Emilio Eduardo Masera and Armando Lambruschini, and Brigadier General Orlando Ramon
Agosti. 94 More than 800 witnesses were presented and the trial covered 700 individual cases
taken from the CONADEP’s case files. 95
The trials and the Nunca Mas report encouraged more prosecutions and strengthened the
ground for the rule of law in Argentina. They gave weight to demands of victims and their
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families to investigate crimes committed by other military perpetrators. However, the call for
trial also allowed authoritarian factions to voice their demands against the prosecution. The
military threatened to launch a coup against the Alfonsin government numerous times, which led
to the amnesty laws. Under this pressure, Alfonsin resigned and called early elections. 96 In 1986
and 1987, laws such as Full Stop and Due Obedience, were enacted as a compromise between
“democratic stability and impunity demands.” 97 They allowed blanket amnesty and immediate
halt of the majority of the investigations. Also, Alfonsin’s successor Carlos Menem granted
presidential pardons to the military leaders convicted in the 1985 military junta trials and few
other individuals who faced continued investigation after the impunity laws. The Menem
administration believed that national pacification through amnesty was the key to move
Argentine society forward, even though many were actually not ready to move on. As a result,
the administration passed laws to discourage prosecution and fact-finding of the past.
Despite the compromises, Argentina’s human rights movement continued to push for
accountability in both domestic and international settings, and over time they were successful. In
the early 1990s, they first persuaded Argentine federal courts to conduct “truth trials,” which are
a judicially-created procedure to obtain official information about the fate of victims before the
criminal courts. 98 In 1996, victims’ relatives also filed several cases in Spanish courts under
universal jurisdiction, which led to the issuance of arrest warrants and extradition requests. In
March 2001, federal judge Gabriel Cavallo found that the Full Stop and Due Obedience laws
were unconstitutional under Argentina’s international human rights obligations. 99 In July 2005,
the National Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Court of Appeals’ decision in the case of Julio
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Hector Simon, a leader of the Argentinean Federal Police during the military dictatorship from
1976 to 1983, bringing charges against Simon relating to kidnapping, torture, and forced
disappearance of persons, and many more cases were reopened. 100 In 2006, an appellate court
also declared unconstitutional the earlier pardons of the junta members who were convicted in
1985 and it was followed by a 2007 ruling of the Supreme Court, which also declared the
invalidity of Menem’s presidential pardon. 101
According to the International Center for Transitional Justice, Argentine authorities
express strong support for prosecuting past crimes today. 102 More than 600 accused face criminal
counts before federal courts and 62 defendants have been sentenced. 103 Unlike the 1980s trials,
today’s trials prosecute not only key leaders but also direct perpetrators including civilians,
priests, judges, and former ministers. However, some in the human rights circle in Argentina
voice a concern that the key to success in Argentina’s transitional justice is time. The scope of
investigation is massive, witnesses and victim protection system is lacking, and evidence relating
to military repression is being destroyed. Thus, they argue that holding the trials at a speedy and
responsive pace would allow Argentina to finally come to terms with its past. 104

Assessment: Transitional Justice, Prosecution, and the Case of South Korea
As seen in the illustrated cases, transitional justice is a very complicated and politicallysensitive stage for any post-conflict society. Some nations, among them Guatemala, Cambodia
and Argentina, in hopes of moving forward with national reconciliation, granted amnesty to war
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criminals and human rights violators, but it rather consolidated the culture of impunity
throughout the country. As was the case in Cambodia, some citizens felt that they were not
compensated for their pain and suffering while criminals became more violent and operated
above the law. In Guatemala, amnesty allowed former military officials and violent criminals to
carry out large-scale drug and human trafficking. However, as can be seen in the case of
Argentina, this country returned to prosecution after 20 years of presidential pardon and even
failed coup attempts. With the help of an active human rights movement of civilian groups and
victims’ families, it has had more transitional human rights trials than any other country in the
world and has enjoyed its longest continuous period of democratic rule since 1983. According to
Sikkink, there are no data that human rights trials have contributed to undermining democracy in
the region, including Argentina. 105 Examples from the listed countries reveal that amnesty is a
useful tool for certain political and economic conditions. However, their examples showed the
world that when a window of opportunity to prosecute and bring justice opens, it must be fully
utilized. The failure to hold trials during transitional justice makes it even harder to do it in the
future. Unresolved problems in the past exacerbate and fester, and they become a rot of the
society that institutionalizes impunity and protects veto-players. Granting amnesty in Time 1
may reinforce impunity and further corruption of the state in Time 2. It produces a negative
social impact that carries over time due to the culture of injustice and unresolved problems. Thus,
prosecution should be given the utmost weight and importance for any nations reckoning itself
from trauma, brutality, and human rights crimes.
Similarly, I will argue that the same is true for the case of South Korea. Using process
tracing to identify critical junctures in South Korea’s historical and political narrative, I will
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demonstrate how the lack of prosecution in Korean society is related to its delayed democratic
consolidation. In Chapter 2, I will examine the post-colonialism period from the mid-1940 to the
late 1950’s when a newly independent Korean government failed to investigate and prosecute
pro-Japanese collaborators who had committed heinous human rights crimes. In Chapter 3, I will
illustrate how the lack of prosecution against the Park Chung-Hee’s regime following the
dictator’s assassination in 1979 further consolidated the culture of impunity and disregard for the
rule of law into the 1980s. Then in Chapter 4, I will profile present day Korea’s status on truth
and reconciliation, and examine the effect that an unresolved past and injustice continue to hold
on today’s Korean society, more than two decades after the much-celebrated transition in the late
1980s.
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CHAPTER 2: 1940s – FORGOTTEN, UNFORGIVEN PAST
Introduction
Just as the end of the World War II brought the collapse of authoritarian regimes in
Germany, Italy, and Japan, it also brought new opportunities for post-World War II colonies to
create their own independent democratic states through the process of decolonization. However,
the tasks of overcoming colonial legacies and building a new democratic system were left
unfulfilled, to be tackled by colonized states at a later time. Korea was not an exception to this. It
had been colonized by Japan since 1910, and the surrender of the Japanese in 1945 brought forth
a political task to create an independent Korean national government. The majority of Koreans
wished for a new free and fair nation that would move past decades of oppression and
humiliation. They also expected former Korean collaborators with the Japanese regime and
Japanese authorities to be prosecuted. However, following the Japanese departure, the bipolar
rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union ensued in the Korean peninsula
internationally and domestically. This rivalry led the two super powers to scramble for spheres of
influence in Korea, and as a result, the fight for spreading ideology took priority over selfgovernment and nation-building for the people of the land.
On September 6, 1945, just weeks after independence from Japan, the Korean People’s
Republic (KPR), a de facto government under the leadership of Yo Un-hyung was formed to
govern the South of the Korean peninsula’s 38th parallel. However, as the U.S. Army, led by
Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, arrived in Seoul, the U.S. authorities not only refused to
recognize the republic but also officially declared it illegal. 106 They instead established the U.S.
Military Government (USMG), which ruled until the pro-U.S. Republic of Korea was founded
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after three years. North of the 38th parallel, the Soviets helped create the pro-communist
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
The superpowers, who each wanted the whole Korean peninsula to be under its sole
control, did not get their wish. The Moscow agreement of December 1945 to work out a four
power trusteeship, among Great Britain, the U.S., China, and Soviet Union, for a period of five
years failed due to disagreement between the two powers, and Korean’s wish to found a new
state free of colonial legacies never materialized. 107 The trusteeship, an international overseeing
device created by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt during the Yalta Conference in February
1945, was a crucial tool to focus U.S. involvement and maintain U.S. interest in Korea while
allowing time to reconstruct Japan. The notion that “Koreans are incapable of self-governing”
was widespread among the four trustees and other nations, and it had been exploited by Japan to
justify its colonial rule. 108 The superpowers failed to heed the Korean people’s anticipation for
immediate self-rule. As a result, it led to the division between the North and the South, and the
process of the separation was violent and costly. It was a critical origin of the Korean War.
Meanwhile, the Rhee administration worked aligned to the interests of the U.S. and
reflected policies that completely disregarded its own citizens’ wish to bring justice by
prosecuting wrongdoers relating to the Japanese colonial era. In this chapter I will argue that the
Rhee administration’s annulment of attempts to punish pro-Japanese collaborators marked a
crucial turning point in Korean history – what path dependency analysis would call a “critical
juncture.” The failure to prosecute wrongdoers positioned Korea onto a pathway that allowed
impunity and internal corruption within Korean society. The Rhee government maintained a
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paucity of accounting and this diminished its legitimacy While this was one of the early
opportunities to establish a true and legitimate democracy, the Rhee administration repressed its
own citizens by enacting laws to completely curtail political dissent and by overseeing multiple
massacres that led to the death of between 600,000 and 1,200,000 victims. 109
Thus, in this chapter, I will analyze this critical juncture by first describing veto-players
of this moment, and then explain impunity that hindered the democratic development of the
newly-independent Korean state. Delving into the players and impunity will facilitate a better
understanding of the nature of injustice and the pathway that slowed down the process of
establishing a democratic nation. After examining these two topics, I will discuss the pathdependent implications of impunity that retrogressed Korea’s democracy.
Veto-Players
To start, I have identified two categories of veto-players in this era: External (the United)
States Military Government in Korea) and Internal (the Rhee administration; former Japanese
collaborators in and out of the state; and the Republic of Korea military).

United States Military Government in Korea
The United States was a power group that tried to veto transitional justice in South Korea.
Rather than allowing Koreans to build a self-governing body that would reflect the interest of its
citizens and create a free and fair society, the U.S. applied paternalistic policies to control
Korean society.
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The role of the U.S. in the Korean peninsula during this particular moment chronicles
back to the Cairo Declaration in 1943, when the U.S. declared that it was committed to a free
Korea. Roosevelt remarked the famous phrase, “in due course Korea shall become
independent.” 110

FIGURE 1: CHRONOLOGY 1940s
August 1945

WWII ended; Liberation of Korea; US military occupation began

August 1945

The Korean People’s Republic (KPR), a de facto government, under the
leadership of Yo Un-hyung was formed, but becomes disbanded. U.S. Military
Government (USMG) led by Lieutenant General John R. Hodge is formed.

December 1945
April 1948
August 1948
September 1948

October 1948

The Moscow agreement among Great Britain, the U.S., and Soviet Union to
work out a four power trusteeship was introduced.
Jeju's April 3 Massacre
The Republic of Korea established
The Anti-Collaboration Act was passed, Anti-Collaboration Committee was
created and started investigating pro-Japanese collaborators. Investigation
came to a halt months after its founding.
Yeosu-Suncheon Incident

Source: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea, Truth and Reconciliation: Activities of the Past Three
Years 18, 29 (2009). Accessed February 2, 2014. http://justicespeaking.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/trc-report.pdf

However, little planning took place between the Cairo meeting and the landing of American
forces at Inchon harbor on September 9, 1945. The U.S. policy in postwar Korea in general
demonstrated a lack of vision, planning, and coordination between the branches of the U.S.
national government and with the U.S. personnel in Korea.
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When the 25,000 men of 24th Corps of the U.S. Army led by Lieutenant General John R.
Hodge arrived in Seoul in September 8, 1945, it was the beginning of official American control
over South Korea. However, General Hodge, an experienced World War II veteran, lacked
knowledge of Korea, except that provided by the Japanese Government-General. 111 Hodge was
ignorant of the fact that Koreans wanted rectification of the past wrong doings of the Japanese
colonial era and a new independent nation. He closely listened to the Japanese authorities and
their allegations that Korea’s new, quasi self-government— the KPR— incited communistic
ideals towards immediate independence. The Japanese claim was a blanket assertion that clearly
mischaracterized the nature of the organization. Instead of the professed American goal of
helping Korea’s new nation-building, a wish that the majority of Koreans desired, Hodge
followed America’s own national and global aim of resisting influences from the Soviet Union.
As a result, the U.S. tore down the KPR, and officially made it illegal to create any selfgoverning body and prohibited all political activities until the U.S. set up an anti-communist
regime in South Korea. However, according to Jeon, the more recent consensus among
revisionist scholars argues that the KPR was more nationalist than communist, had considerable
popular support, and advocated a social and economic movement desired by the majority of
Koreans. 112 General Hodge went as far as to declare Korea to be “the enemy of the United States”
and ordered his troops to carry out everything according to the customs fitting an enemy
country. 113 While Koreans welcomed the U.S. troops as an army of liberation, the U.S. forces
nevertheless equated Korea as a provocative, dangerous state.

111

Hugh Dyson Walker, East Asia: A New History. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2012: 607.
Sang Sook Jeon, “U.S. Korean Policy and the Moderates During the U.S. Military Government Era.” In Korea
under the American Military Government, 1945-1948, op. cit. : 81.
113
Ibid.
112

Yang 50
At that time, Korea was not regarded as a sovereign state according to international law,
despite having been freed from Japan. 114 The U.S. forces capitalized on this legal distinction, and
thus, claimed authority over all “ownerless land,” which provided the legal basis of the
occupation of the Korean peninsula. In place of the KPR, the U.S. set up a formal U.S. Army
Military Government in Korea (AMG) and dismantled most of local committees of the KPR,
replacing them with a discredited colonial administrative structure throughout the country.
Rather than rely on Korean politicians, the Military Government recruited discharged Japanese
as “administrative advisors” and endorsed the Korean Democratic Party, which was made up of
former Japanese collaborators. As a result, the eleven members of the Korean Advisory Council
were largely members of the KDP. 115 The actions of the U.S. occupation force quickly ended
Korean expectations that liberation from Japan would result in national independence and
political autonomy for the whole peninsula.
While the U.S. forces occupied Korea, it attempted to form a joint supervision by the
United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China. However, the trusteeship decision was
a disappointment to Koreans. Political independence and the punishment of collaborators did not
happen. The United States in this era lacked concrete and long-term goals to build a democratic
nation, and Korea’s true post-independence was secondary to its goals. The policies that they
advanced favored conservatives, which included a good number of Japanese collaborators, and
thus, the expectation of rectifying Japanese colonialism was never realized. Finally, it gave
priority to global anti-communist priorities, and associated Korean nationalism with a potential
communist threat. For all of these reasons, the U.S. used its power to “veto” attempts at legal
justice.
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Former Japanese Collaborators In and Out of the State
After Korea’s independence, the U.S. military government decided to maintain the
bureaucratic personnel and institutions from the Japanese colonial government. As a result, it
was nearly impossible to punish collaborators without permission from USAMGIK, which
protected the reemployment of collaborator personnel while controlling people’s zeal for severe
punishment. Collaborators transformed themselves into bureaucrats and the pro-American forces
continuously bolstered their new social status.
Many collaborators maintained posts in the Korean Democratic Party under the
leadership of Rhee Syng-Man. In September 1948, the Anti-Collaboration Act was passed in the
National Assembly, with a committee to appoint a special judge and a special prosecutor to carry
out the preparatory investigation of collaboration. 116 Yet, former collaborators hindered the
legislation process and activities of the Anti-Collaboration Committee with threats, instigation of
mass demonstration, and terrorist acts. There was even an attempted assassination of a member
of the Anti-Collaboration Committee by some high-ranking police officers who had collaborated
with imperial Japan. 117
Collaborators thus further achieved a rise in status and climbed the social ladder to the
ruling class. Under the Rhee administration, as much as 34 percent of department ministers and
68 percent of chief justices and justices of the Supreme Court were collaborators, while making
up a quarter of the National Assembly. 118 In 1960, 70% of senior superintendents, 40% of police
captains, and 15% of police lieutenants had all served in the Japanese colonial government and
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still remained as police officers following liberation. 119 Statistics compiled by a private research
organization indicate that among the highest public officials in Korean society in the early 1980s,
121 were collaborators, including the president, chief justice, prime minister, chiefs of the staff
in the Army, Navy, and Air Force, prosecutors, senior superintendents, mayors, and provincial
governors. 120
Collaborators became elites in the economy, media, education, culture, art, and religion
in postcolonial Korean society. 121 Unresolved Issues in History, a book published in South Korea
investigating former Korean collaborators with the Japanese regime, includes articles on 60
collaborators and their personal backgrounds, most of whom were in positions of leadership in
every area of Korean society after liberation. 122 In particular, they played crucial roles in
maintaining the anticommunist dictatorship and in the modernization process in South Korea.
They became credited as public servants and patriots, while those who had fought for
independence against the Japanese became victims of anti-communism sentiment. Accordingly,
collaborators dominated Korean society following the independence. Despite their past
wrongdoings and benefits from Imperial Japan, the former Japanese collaborators quickly erased
their past for their benefit and amassed veto-power over transitional justice during the Rhee era.

The Rhee Administration
Another veto-player that resisted legal justice was the Rhee administration, which was a
conservative coalition that protected former Japanese collaborators. In May 1948, the Korean
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National Assembly adopted a constitution setting forth a presidential form of government
specifying a four-year term for the presidency. Rhee Syng-Man, a Princeton-educated politician,
was especially favored by the U.S. because of his conservative stance against communism. The
U.S. played an influential role in deciding the head of the state, as the leftist faction of the
political sphere was marginalized and maintained little voice in the National Assembly. Soon,
Rhee became head of the new Assembly. Then, on August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea
(South Korea) was proclaimed, Rhee assumed the presidency with the backing of the U.S.
Politically, Rhee controlled the nation with an iron fist. He unilaterally amended the constitution
to change his term limits to four, while threatening to dissolve the National Assembly if it failed
to support his power grab. 123 The National Assembly was a unicameral body, and a majority was
made up of Rhee’s supporters. 124
Leading a new nation healing itself from its colonial past, Rhee relied heavily upon the
United States for both financial and political help. Specifically, the policy of the Rhee
administration was one of “unification by force,” in which the government allowed no room for
suspicious acts of communism in the South. With no adherence to due process, even judges and
prosecutors faced arrests when they ruled favorably to those who were imprisoned for suspicions
of communist acts. 125 As a result, the Rhee administration carried out multiple massacres that led
to the death of hundreds of thousands of innocent citizens. Rhee’s implementation of
authoritarian and conservative policies made him veto looking into the past. There must have
been something that Rhee refrained to disclose.

123

Michael Breen, "Fall of Korea’s First President Syngman Rhee in 1960." The Korea Times. Accessed October 10,
2013. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/01/113_64364.html.
124
Ibid.
125
Dong-Choon Kim, "The Long Road Toward Truth And Reconciliation." Critical Asian Studies 42.4 (2010): 534.

Yang 54
One significant, tragic massacre that occurred during the Rhee administration was the
massacre of the NGA (Kuk-min-bo-do-yeon-maeng) members. Formed in 1938 by former
nationalists and leftists, the NGA became a crucial target for Rhee’s postcolonial state. By
preserving the colonial forms and procedures, the NGA was targeted to advance the South Korea
state project of converting and defeating nationalists and others who had once demanded the
punishment of former collaborators. Its members, numbering three hundred thousand, reported
regularly to the police and were used by them as an informant network. It has been alleged that
many of its members were innocent farmers and civilians who lacked knowledge of ideological
conflicts but were forced to register. 126 They were pressured to cooperate with the new state by
promoting voluntary confessions, persuading political prisoners to convert. While some worried
that their past could arouse the new government’s suspicion, they nonetheless came under
suspicion when the government rounded them up. Especially on the day that North Korea
invaded the South in 1950, the Security Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs ordered the
police to detail all members of the NGA nationwide and eliminate them in silence. 127 This event
is one of many horrifying acts of violence that the Rhee administration carried out to get rid of
any individuals or organizations that were suspicious of being communists and those who called
for the prosecution of former Japanese collaborators.
On a mission to defeat the Red Peril, the Rhee administration failed to move the nation
from its postcolonial damages. Rather, it persecuted its citizens on the ground of unreasonable
suspicion and awarded former Japanese collaborators with posts in cabinet and military
leaderships. 128 The government, uncertain of its future between the United States and the Soviet

126

Ji-Sook Bae, "Gov’t Killed 3,400 Civilians During War." The Korea Times. March 2, 2009. Accessed October 10,
2013. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/03/117_40555.html.
127
Jae-Jung Suh, "Truth And Reconciliation In South Korea." Critical Asian Studies 42.4 (2010): 518.
128
Bruce Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997: 201.

Yang 55
Union, heavily repressed political activities to prevent any leftist organizing and pursued proAmerican policies.

The Republic of Korea Military
With U.S. financial support, the Korean military under the Rhee administration,
specifically the Korean National Police and special military units, tightened the regime’s grasp
over domestic politics. The Korean military often declared the state of emergency as a
convenient excuse for the regime to crack down on any of Rhee’s opposition. While the Republic
of Korea (ROK) military was created for the purpose of combat situations, Rhee specialized
several divisions within the military to be used for political purposes. 129
Military and police units were especially vicious in taking revenge on South Koreans
who had cooperated with the North Korean military during the early months of the war. In the
summer of 1950, when the Korean People’s Army (KPA), the North Korean military, occupied
the majority of ROK territory, some South Koreans had assisted North Korean forces in
reestablishing the North’s self-government, seizing and redistributing Japanese property, and
maintaining order. When the U.S. and ROK troops recaptured the territory south of the 38th
parallel in September of 1950, the South Korean police and army mercilessly punished and
slaughtered collaborators with the North. 130
Rhee himself also used the military to hold onto power. In July 1952, when the National
Assembly refused to pass Rhee’s constitutional amendment calling for the president to be chosen
by direct election instead of by the assembly, Rhee declared martial law and ordered military

129

Gregg Brazinsky, Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007: 27.
130
Ibid., p. 28.

Yang 56
police units to hold the lawmakers hostage until they finally agreed to his proposal. 131 With this
military tactic, Rhee was able to extend his tenure in office again in 1956. 132
During the mid- and late 1950s the State Department received a constant stream of
communications from American diplomats detailing the ways that Rhee was using the national
police and army units to intimidate and control his opponents. One State Department official
who was stationed in Korea during 1957 said that the “Executive will is enforced by a
centralized national police,” which was deeply involved in political affairs, especially the
surveillance of opposition groups.” 133 Rhee used both the ROK Army Counter Intelligence
Corps and the Joint Provost Marshal Command “for security as well as political actions.” 134 For
the Rhee administration, these special units were useful in both preventing insurgency and
controlling sources of political dissent until the late 1950s. 135
The military was a forceful, systematic veto-player that was protected by the elites and
politics of the Korean society. It was able to stand strong against accusations of impunity and
tried to brand itself as a positive force that would save the nation from communist influences.
Yet, in fact, it persecuted its own citizens and maintained a stronghold on its privileges, while
vetoing any power that would threaten their power.
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Impunity
Impunity and collective amnesia went hand in hand as the Rhee administration did not
merely exonerate those who had committed grave crimes of violence, terrorism, and mass
killings. It justified its actions as necessary to stem communism, and praised the perpetrators for
risking their lives to fight communism.
In the 1940s after the Japanese surrender, many Koreans who were collaborators with the
Japanese regime were absolved of their past crimes and were protected by the Rhee
administration. Since it was more convenient for the occupational government to recruit
experienced Korean administrators from the former Japanese governmental apparatus, these
individuals were not punished even after the nation’s independence even though many of them
had willingly cooperated with Japanese colonial rule. The U.S. Military government employed
them in spite of their past, and they later secured high-ranking positions in the Rhee
government. 136 The U.S. policy of absolving Korean collaborators to the Japanese regime from
the Tokyo Tribunal was in line with the occupation policy of the U.S. Military Government in
Korea. 137 This policy judged Japanese-trained soldiers, intelligence agents, and police officers to
be useful in the suppression of communist operations in South Korea. Yet, in return, their violent
tactics and abuses brought fear and terror to Korean citizens.
Calls for the prosecution of Japanese collaborators in order to obtain historical justice
were not easily dismissed. Even President Rhee, who aligned himself with many of the former
collaborators, felt compelled to accept the Act and used executive powers to create a body to
investigate and prosecute Japanese collaborators in accordance with the law. 138 However, the
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first attempt at historical justice and truth did not last long. As soon as the committee was formed,
it began to be assaulted by conservatives who were former collaborators or had aligned
themselves with collaborators for personal gain. The Rhee government hindered the Act’s
implementation by accusing the committee of communist-influenced leadership and protesting
that the Act might be misused to arrest “patriots” who had fought against the communists.
In December 1948, the government enacted the National Security Law, a continuation of
the former security Maintenance Law of Imperial Japan, and revived the Japanese-style police
apparatus that had been notorious for torturing those who struggled for Korea’s independence. 139
The Rhee government annulled legislative attempts to prosecute pro-Japanese collaborators; in
doing so he exonerated those who had committed grave crimes against their fellow countrymen
on behalf of Imperial Japan. This marked a crucial turning point. After, government officials,
police officers, and military officials who had cooperated with Imperial Japan were able to retain
their power during the Rhee government and subsequent military regimes. Some who had
previously held positions in the Japanese police’s intelligence agency were recruited into the G-2
Sections and Counter Intelligence Corps. 140 Freed from judicial prosecution, the Japanese-trained
soldiers and police took vengeance on nationalists and specifically those who had demanded
historical justice in the postliberation years. The former collaborators quickly transformed
themselves into patriotic anticommunists. 141 In order to consolidate their power, they exercised
their power to accuse the accusers of being communists and to kill many of them.
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Implications of Impunity for Korea’s Democracy
The exoneration and empowerment of pro-Japanese police and bureaucrats led Koreans
to lose faith in their government. It created a culture of distrust that encouraged political unrest
and on-going social conflicts across the country. Dissent, distrust, and disillusionment filled the
country. As the country moved away from unification, frustrated by the partition of the peninsula,
the left in Korea went against the impunity-based Rhee regime.
This unstable public sentiment and political sphere led to the Jejudo and Yeosun
Incidents, both in 1948. In Jejudo, hundreds of partisan forces rebelled against the general
election that was set to legitimize national division. The Korean National Police and military,
supported by U.S. troops, opened fire on the group and took control over Jeju Island. Out of
150.000 residents, 30,000 were known to have been killed for their involvement with the
guerillas. 142 Following this event, in Yeosun, approximately 2,000 left-wing soldiers rebelled
against the government in protest against its heavy-handed clampdown on the uprising in Jeju.
Soldiers seized weapons and took control of the town. Soon, the South Korean army, with the
help of U.S. military advisers, overwhelmed the rebels. Today, the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of Korea (TRKC) has confirmed that the number of casualties tally up to 439. 143
The Rhee government responded to such mobilization by the political opposition by instituting
martial law, whereby field officers arrested and killed civilians based on their own interpretation
of law.
The administration allowed the use of torture by the Korean National Police and military,
lynching, and even summary executions to promote anticommunism. The Rhee government
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ignored due process of law and judicial process as a whole, and it regularly committed violations
of human rights. Intelligence agencies were able to coerce and intimidate judges and warnings
were routinely issued to the courts. 144 The empowerment of Japanese collaborators and the
failure to bring justice in the case of past wrongdoings culminated in the mass civilian killings
the Rhee government committed before and during the Korean War. Justice was denied for the
sake of eliminating any communist influence, and it deprived everyday citizens of fundamental
rights and took the lives of many.
The experience of the Korean War firmly consolidated the injustices of the postliberation
years. The war legitimated and developed the military, and it became the one of the most
organized and influential forces in South Korean society. As a result, anticommunist ideology
penetrated ordinary Koreans daily lives, taking away from public discourse such inconvenient
truths as the corruption of state power and the mass killings of innocent civilians by Korean
police. Everyday citizens were taught to fear state power, remain quiet about the past, and
distance themselves from political procedures. The Rhee government, though elections and
modern judicial systems were enacted, was a mere procedural democracy that was hungry for the
attention of the United States while interests of its citizens became void.

Conclusion
On August 15, 1945, as soon as the Japanese surrender was confirmed, Koreans all across
the peninsula came out to the streets, yelling out “Manse!” and “Haebang!” which meant
freedom and liberation from Japan. They naturally expected that after decades of humiliation and
both physical and emotional toil under the Japanese regime, their lives would be renewed under a
new independent state. However, their freedom was never truly free. Korean’s first
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independently created self-government was disbanded by the U.S. Military. When Rhee, with the
backing of U.S., became the first president of Republic of Korea, his administration went along
with U.S. policies for a pro-American government and for quick nation-building from the chaos
and political vacuum of post-colonialism. Yet his conservative coalition brought lenient charges
against former Japanese collaborators and employed them to heavily repress their fellow citizens.
The failure to disrupt the remains of colonial bureaucracy at this critical juncture of
Korea’s liberation led to the development of state terrorism, human rights abuses, paucity of due
process, and importantly, disconnection with its own citizens. State elites, who had benefitted
from the Japanese colonial government, maintained their posts in national governmental
apparatus and consolidated their power. While there were efforts to rectify the colonial past,
they were soon brought to a stop by Cold War ideological conflicts.
Today, “truth and reconciliation” scholar Jae-Jung Suh argues that rectification of the
Japanese colonial era was a necessary step towards historical justice and the transformation of
Korean politics. 145 The United States should have focused less on quick nation-building, and
more on bringing strict adherence to the rule of law, mass political participation of citizens, and
allowing civil society to form. While experienced personnel were needed for infrastructure
within the governmental structure, setting a strong precedent that past wrongdoers would be
prosecuted was needed to set an example of respecting and adhering to the law. As a result, the
cold war distractions and political repression located Korea onto a path that institutionalized
impunity and allowed veto-players to rule the society with violent repression. This
disillusionment and illegitimacy filled the Rhee era, and it paved a way for the public’s
discontent and distrust, then soon to a violent military takeover in 1961.
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CHAPTER 3: 1980s – SPRING DID NOT COME TO SEOUL
Introduction: 1979-80, Korea’s Next Critical Juncture
In 1961, the Rhee administration was toppled by military coup under the leadership of
General Park Chung-Hee, a graduate of a Japanese military academy in Manchuria. The military
justified the coup by claiming it needed to save Korea from communist influences. One of the
main reasons for the fall of the Rhee government was its incompetence in ruling the country. The
Rhee administration did not respond to various demands from below after the Korean War, nor
did it properly control the military. The military was strong enough to counter the transition to
democracy because it was the de facto monopolized physical power and developed over time
with the financial support of the U.S. since the Korean War.
After taking over the presidency, Park aggressively promoted economic development
policies. The success of his economic development plans offset the lack of legitimacy, which is
evident in his landslide win in the 1967 presidential election. However, his economic miracle,
which had sacrificed the rights and dignity of working class and middle class Koreans, faced
growing opposition from labor unions and workers. Students and dissidents led massive protests
against Park’s repressive policies.
The discontent against the Park’s regime’s repression and the democratic movement’s
resistance created a divide within state elites. As a result, the KCIA chief, Kim Chae-Kyu,
assassinated Park on October 26, 1979. 146 His assassination opened up the prospect of regime
change in South Korea, and expectations for democratization were higher than ever.
This particular moment of opening for democracy was known as the “Seoul Spring” of
1979-1980, and this moment was another critical juncture for South Korea’s political
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development. 147 With the wave of democratization that ended authoritarian regimes across the
world, the time was ripe for Korea to end its decades-old dictatorship. There were opposition
parties, increasingly based on the middle class, and student and labor movements grew to protest
against the stagnant processes for democratization. Equally importantly, Korea encountered rapid
industrialization. To seize this opportunity for democratization, it was urgent to determine a
schedule for democratic transition in a transparent and speedy manner. It required a
constitutional amendment to mitigate the executive branch’s power and a free and fair civilian
election with opposing parties.
Contrary to public expectations for democratization, however, the plan for democratic
transition was obscure during the Seoul Spring. The transitional government under President
Choi Kyu-Ha failed to repeal the remnants of Park’s repressive structure of the government.
Choi, who was a strict administrator by nature and not a charismatic leader, was reluctant to
present a concrete plan for democratization. Then, on December 12, 1979, hard-line General
Chun Doo-Hwan seized power within the army, which gradually darkened the prospect of
democratization. 148 Nonetheless, the democratization movement quickly spread during April and
early May of 1980. Students and union workers protested the delayed transition to democracy
and pressured for its speedy progress. Yet, in the end, Seoul’s Spring could not be achieved.
Having seized military power through the December 12th coup, Chun’s forces took power from
the Choi administration by declaring martial law on May 17, 1980. By this point, most of the
efforts for democratization came to a halt.
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In this chapter, I will present a case study of this second “window of opportunity” for
democracy that produced neither democracy nor justice in Korea. I will first identify the vetoplayers of the era. There were multiple influential players who held both political and economic
power and who wanted to keep that power in the post-Park era. Closely examining their powerful
networks within Korean society will reveal the choices that located Korea onto the impunity path,
and how they were remains of the colonial and dictatorial legacy. Then, I address how the path
of impunity was further consolidated during the 1970s and the 1980s. As former Japanese
collaborators solidified their stance in the state and civil society and their wrongdoings were left
untackled, the Park and Chun regimes used both human rights violations and political corruption
to amend the political system as they wished. Thus, the impunity section will focus on the lack of
accounting for the crimes of these violent regimes and lack of transparency for those who
became silent victims of what was called the Yushin system in which the executive held
indefinite power. Then, after examining impunity, I will carry out an in-depth analysis of the
critical juncture of the Seoul Spring itself (October 1979-May 1980). While the circumstance and
time was right for democracy, democratic transition failed to take root. Thus, I am going to
investigate the significance of lack of prosecution of human rights abuse in a democratically
transitioning state like South Korea, and how prosecution might have consolidated a burgeoning
democracy.
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FIGURE 2: CHRONOLOGY 1960s to 1980s
May 1961
October 1963
May 1967

May 16, military coup under the leadership of General Park Chung-Hee
Park Chung-Hee was elected president
Park Chung-Hee wins general presidential election

October 1972

Revitalizing (Yushin) Reforms proclaimed

October 1979

President Park Chung-Hee assassinated

December 1979
May 1980
August 1980

General Chun Doo-Hwan seized power within the military
May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement occurs, but the military quickly
repressed the protest movement with force.
General Chun Doo-Hwan took office as president

Source: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea, Truth and Reconciliation: Activities of the Past Three
Years 18, 29 (2009). Accessed February 2, 2014. http://justicespeaking.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/trc-report.pdf

Veto-Players
In the time between October 1979 and May 1980 in South Korea, the main veto-players resisting
accountability for human rights abuses were U.S. corporations, American domestic politics, and
the military’s Hanahoe club.

U.S. Corporations
American business interests played a key role in South Korea, as the Park and Chun
administrations pushed for modernization policies. For American business leaders, democratic
reform in South Korea was a secondary concern to economic liberalization. As long as they were
able to seek the bottom line for their shareholders and a stable economic environment in Korea,
they continued to back the repressive regime and maintained business contracts with
conglomerates in Korea. Their interest in investment and trade in South Korea was promoted by
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U.S. government officials’ pressure to Korea. There were several moments in which American
business interest flexed their power alongside the Park administration.
In the late 1970s, the anti-nuclear-power movement in the U.S. had pushed the U.S.
government to rescind new orders for domestic plants, and South Korea became a convenient
solution to the problem of Westinghouse’s surplus production capacity. 149 Westinghouse and the
nuclear industry stood to gain tens of billions of dollars in contracts for nuclear power plants 7
and 8 alone. Park was first indecisive about the proposal because he knew that building
laboratories for science institutes and a major highway that connected Seoul and major Southern
cities were higher policy priorities than building nuclear power plants. However, when President
Moore of the U.S. Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank visited Park on behalf of Westinghouse to lobby
for the nuclear plants, Park had to reluctantly accept the offer, since Korea was Ex-Im bank’s
biggest borrower. 150
In the same period, California and Gulf Coast agribusiness harvested a surplus of medium
grain rice. Korea, faced with a terrible harvest in 1980 during the Chun administration, sought to
make up the deficit by importing from California agribusiness. However, just before the sale of
644,000 tons went through, California farmers raised the price by $100/ton, profiting an extra
$64 million.151 Also, when Korea needed a million more tons of rice, the farmers raised even
more than $100/ton above the record price of that time. Korea accepted the following unfair
deals due to the heavy lobbying by the Rice Millers Association to the Korean Embassy.
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When American businessmen showed concerns towards Korea’s lack of stability in the
markets, Park and Chun frequently invited American business leaders to the Blue House and
assured them that they would open up the market for investment purposes. Namely, to help allay
investor fears, Chun invited leaders of the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea, including
the president of 3-M and representatives of Bank of America, Dow Chemical, and Gulf Oil. 152
American corporations supported the Park regime despite accusations of human rights
abuses coming out of the Carter administration. As long as they were able to invest in Korea
under stable and secure environment, corporations found ways to maintain business-friendly
relationship with Seoul. American corporations also had close relationships with Korean vetoplayers, especially business conglomerates and elites of the society, to push for business
contracts that deemed profitable to their ends. The veto-players resisted accountability, and
everyday business was carried out, overruling any concerns of the government’s heinous past.

American Domestic Politics / Public Opinion
During the period between 1979 and 1980, Korea was directly affected by American
domestic politics. There were two critical events that facilitated the shift from protecting human
rights to pursuing U.S. national security interests in Korea. The Iranian revolution in 1979 and
the Soviet Union’s Afghanistan invasion that same year had a direct impact on U.S. policy
towards South Korea. 153 Sacrificing security in order to promote democracy and human rights –
what had been the focus of President Carter’s foreign policy— became widely unpopular in
America, which at the time was facing a humiliating hostage crisis and a renewed battle in the
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Cold War. 154 This diverted attention of both the State Department and the Carter administration,
which shied away from the events in South Korea. William Gleysteen, U.S. ambassador to South
Korea, noting that “Iran distracted the administration while it disciplined them,” utilized this
public criticism to exert more pressure on the State Department and the Carter administration to
respond to the Korean situation with caution. 155 The Carter administration maintained its
“security first” policy throughout 1979 and 1980 in Korea. The U.S. realized that the military
was the critical player in this transitional period, and paid close attention to its movements.
While Robert Rich, director of Korean Affairs in the department at that time, alleged that “the
Iran analogy existed at the White House and congressional level,” 156 Ambassador Gleysteen also
noted that heavy U.S. involvement in the Korean government may have produced anti-American
outbursts in Korea like those in Iran. 157 Others such as Secretary of State Cyrus Vance joined in
to use the Iran example to warn against pressing too hard on the Korean government. Also,
Carter was running for re-election against the hawkish Republican candidate Ronald Reagan. At
the center of the presidential election was American security issue dealing with Iran, and Carter
tried to calm the public and American voters by changing to more adamant military action. Thus,
America’s public criticism of Korea by analogy as potentially “another Iran” and Carter’s effort
to secure re-election may help to explain why the human rights-conscious Carter administration
in 1979 changed its policy of asserting overt pressure on the Korean government for
liberalizations.
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Hanahoe
Hanahoe was a secret military society that General Chun Doo-Hwan and General Roh
Tae-Woo, along with graduates of the eleventh class of the Korean Military Academy, created in
1955. 158 Chun and Roh specifically recruited officers who originated from the same home
province, Kyong Sang province, as themselves. Its purpose was to build up a special coalition to
help each other in the military hierarchy and political sphere. In particular, this military society
was loyal to President Park, and he endorsed the society in return. Park appointed members of
Hanahoe to military posts to help repress members of opposition parties. Hanahoe was
considered the club of hard-liners in the military and closely contributed in Chun’s rise as the
leader. 159 It was a veto-player that maintained its strong grip on the Korean society through
political and forceful force, quelling any movement that would threaten its privileged position
and helping Chun’s rise to the power.
On the night of December 12, 1979, Chun, along with others members of Hanahoe,
launched a rapid and violent operation to arrest the Army’s pro-democracy chief of staff, General
Chung Seung-Hwa. 160 General Chung had initially vowed to keep the military out of politics and
support the Choi administration for democratic transition. But because of this coup within the
armed forces, Chun was able to seize control of the Korean military. The arrest of General
Chung was possible because Hanahoe members maintained crucial posts as military leadership
all throughout Seoul. They disrupted military communication and ignored orders from the tophierarchy, while making sure that General Chung was captured. Soon, Chun became the chief of
the KCIA, an action rendered illegal by Chun’s refusal to resign from the military. With the
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position that allowed Chun more threatening power, he hired Hanahoe members as KCIA agents
and pressured the civilian government to declare martial law. Protests culminated on May 15,
1980, when 70,000 to 100,000 students demonstrated in the heart of Seoul. Yet, on May 18,
Chun suspended all political activity, closed the universities and arrested prominent rivals such
as Kim Dae-Jung. Martial law brought an end to the protests. In the months after the uprising,
Chun, with the help of Hanahoe members, went through the motions of amending the
constitution and reorganizing his election as president by an electoral college of regime loyalists.
Thus, Hanahoe was a major veto-player that kept Korea on the impunity path. It was the
backbone of Chun’s ambitious plan to emerge as the leader of a non-democratic Korea. They
capitalized on the kinship of Kyong Sang province and convinced heads of military powers to
follow Chun’s rule. Opposition parties were forcefully aborted by Hanahoe members. As they
controlled both the military and politics, the history of human rights abuse and repressive
military action by the Park administration was again, continued through this specific veto-player,
without any room to put a check on their power.

Impunity During (and for) the Park Regime
The impunity path that was created during the Rhee administration had allowed a military
coup that overthrew Rhee’s presidency. The path was continued and protected by veto-players,
and when Park himself was assassinated, the window of opportunity for democratization with
justice was closed off too quickly because of veto-players, both internal and external ones, who
had remained powerful.
Park’s regime was marked by his oppression towards his own citizens. It led to a myriad
of injustices, such as torture, fabricated espionage charges, and suspicious deaths. Park
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frequently proclaimed a state of emergency and suppressed democratic movements with an iron
fist. Moreover, he created a legally and physically powerful intelligence entity, the Korean
National Intelligence Agency (KCIA), to closely monitor anti-governmental activists. 161 The
KCIA committed countless human rights violations with the power that it acquired from the
executive. The agency arbitrarily detained individuals while in some cases, permitted summary
executions. 162
Impunity was already well entrenched in the Park regime in many ways. By this time,
many Japanese collaborators had consolidated their positions in both private and public sectors.
Fifteen years had passed since the end of World War II and it made it that much more difficult to
bring up the issue of their punishment now that Park, a former Japanese military officer and an
anti-communist conservative, had taken over control. On the international side, even the U.S.
found it difficult to deal with the Park administration. When Jimmy Carter became president in
the mid-1970s, he put the issue of human rights abuses by President Park near the top of the U.S.
foreign policy agenda. 163 After Park’s proclamation of emergency decrees to crack down on
rising opposition, the Carter administration and the Congress argued for cuts in military aid for
South Korea to pressure the Park administration to be more responsive to U.S. concerns on
human rights. Carter also announced plans for U.S. ground troop withdrawal in 1977. Yet, Park
denied the existence of any human rights problems in South Korea. 164 Alleging that Carter had
failed to understand South Korea’s unique circumstance of national division and military
confrontation against North Korea, Park’s advisors criticized Carter’s policy of military
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withdrawal as an ill-informed policy that would hurt U.S. interests in stabilizing the Korean
peninsula. At a state reception, Park remarked, “the protection and the survival of the thirty-six
million [South] Korean people [constitutes] the highest [possible] form of [protecting] freedom,
human rights, and democracy.” 165 The Carter administration, to the contrary, argued that human
rights abuses were “neither necessary nor justifiable even in South Korea’s difficult military
situation.” 166
Responding to the Carter administration’s punitive measures, Park released fourteen
leading dissidents from prison on July 17, 1977. 167 However, Carter’s human rights policy was
an impractical and politically unpopular policy that neither satisfied the human rights activists
nor brought an end to human rights violations under Park’s regime. According to Kim, while
Carter even created a bureau specially dedicated for human rights issues in the State Department,
officials from the department and Carter’s key advisors still viewed human rights as secondary to
“military, economic, and strategic considerations.” 168 Meanwhile, Carter’s withdrawal policy
was met by opposition from the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and senior
officials of the State Department. The security interests won major support and the commitment
to the existing alliance was renewed in late 1979, as the Carter administration called for a new
cold war to contain communist threats after the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. By his
last year as president, Carter brought down “his zeal for human rights issues.” 169 Instead, he
focused on the strategic value of the U.S.-South Korean alliance. With the security issues
affirming the existential cold war threat looming the Korean peninsula, human rights violations
and Park’s Yushin system fully operated as necessities for national defense.
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The Rise and Decline of the “Seoul Spring”
The transition between the assassination of Park in October 1979 and Chun’s rise to
power in May 1980 was arguably not enough time in which to uncover the accumulated past
wrongdoings by the state. But one puzzle remains: even though the prospects for a transition
were very promising, even the basics of a democratic transition failed to occur in that 5 month
period. Two factors seem to account best for the failed transition of 1979 - 1980.
The first factor is that the interim government under Choi Kyu-Ha had failed to liberalize
the dictatorial legacy and directly deal with wrongdoings of the Park administration. Choi’s lack
of “political experience and leadership qualities” was evident when he became the acting
president. 170 Choi angered opposition leaders when he announced a plan for an interim
government before consulting them. 171 Choi had indicated a preference for democracy. He
promised to reform the Yushin constitution that was written by the Park regime that guaranteed
Park’s permanent presidency by indirect presidential election. He relaxed the political
atmosphere by abolishing Emergency Decree No. 9, which was used to repress dissent during the
Park regime, and releasing political prisoners and opposition politicians, including Kim DaeJung. Although President Choi had promised to revise the constitution by the end of 1980 and to
call a free and fair election 172 that would be held in a timely manner, both the opposition and the
government expressed fears that Choi’s refusal to announce a concrete timetable for
constitutional reform and new elections was increasing the possibility of North Korean
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intervention.

173

Ambassador Gleysteen was pessimistic about Choi’s ability to run the

government, and he began to focus on other men, such as Prime Minister Shin. 174
President Choi had also failed to infuse his transition with transitional justice. Using this
option may have reinforced Choi as a charismatic leader with control over the military and
domestic politics, perhaps leading the country to a timely democratic transition. Since the
country was experiencing a devastating and uncertain time after President Park’s assassination, it
was much more necessary to set the order that no one is above the law and individuals and
entities will be prosecuted for their crimes against the humanity. The country needed a check on
its decades-old human rights violations and its veto-players’ consolidation of power. However,
President Choi spent most of his career as a bureaucrat and failed to have an autonomous base in
the regime. He could not maneuver the government like Park Chung-Hee, who managed all the
decisions by himself through his power base. As a result, Choi made decisions consulting with
former and incumbent bureaucrats. 175 He did not have a solid independent power base within the
military either.

With the December military takeover by General Chun, the U.S., seeking

stability and order on the peninsula, favored Chun over the Choi administration. Choi, failing to
move efficiently and effectively, ended up the victim of a military coup. Another opportunity to
face the past and focus on nation-building was once again thwarted by the veto-players and the
lack of leadership by the administration.
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The second factor is that the U.S. shied away from an active effort to ensure the
transition’s success. This transition period brought special challenge to the U.S. in deciding how
to favor liberalization both gently and effectively without meddling too much in the domestic
affairs of South Korea. Ambassador Gleysteen was clearly aware of the fact that the public in
South Korea could have had a strong anti-American reaction if the U.S. did not support a
democratic transition. However, according to Fowler, he seemed to fear an anti-American
reaction within the Korean military even more. In the telegram from Gleysteen to Secretary
Vance, he argued against pushing “too hard and too crassly” for liberalization. 176 Initially,
General John Wickham, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, and Gleysteen considered supporting
a counter-coup within the military by anti-Chun generals, but decided against it. 177 Gleysteen,
noting that the “United States should resist oversimplifying Korean politics by making Chun
Doo-Hwan the sinister source of all evil,” decided to defend Chun. 178
As a result, when Chun imposed nation-wide martial law in May 1980 and led to
thousands of casualties all throughout the country, the U.S. hesitated to question his authority.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Forces approved Chun’s use of Combined Forces Command, joint military
personnel stationed along the North-South border, to quell the uprisings. The National Security
Council meeting on May 22, 1980 decided that the American approach to the Korean
government to be “short term support, in the longer term pressure for political evolution.” 179 A
memo from the national security adviser lays out the justification for this approach:
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1. Maintain security on the Korean peninsula and strategic stability in Northeast Asia.
(Do not contribute to “another Iran”— a big Congressional concern.)
2. Express a carefully calibrated degree of disapproval, public and private, towards
recent events in Korea. (But not in a way which would contribute to instability by
suggesting we are encouraging opposition to the Government.) 180
Accordingly, the Carter administration supported the suppression of the democratization
movement in South Korea, even the infamous Gwangju uprising. On May 31, 1980, Carter told a
CNN interviewer that “security interests must sometimes override human rights concerns.”181
Thus, the Carter administration failed to use an important human rights right tool in the interest
of security, and its hesitating silence helped cost South Korea an opportunity for democratic
transition, as well as innocent lives.
The negotiated transition model is the most conventional model that is applied to Korea
for the period between 1979 and 1980. There were five actors during this period: hardliners and
reformers in the ruling bloc, moderates and radicals in the opposition bloc, and the U.S. 182
According to the negotiated transition model, if the hardliners are more powerful than the
reformers, the transition will be aborted. Likewise, if the moderates in the opposition bloc can’t
maintain control over the radicals, the negotiation for democratization becomes impossible. The
Korean case showed such conditions. The hardline military rose to power and controlled the
reformers. The moderate New Democratic Party failed to be an opposition bloc due to its internal
division on choosing a leadership and its failure to support the social movements.
However, had Choi pressured actively for the U.S. intervention to ally with both
reformers and moderates and forcefully win over the hardliners and the radicals, the outcome
180

Memo – Gregg to Brzezinski, 21 May 1980, DDRS – Doc. CK3100466142. Cited in ibid.
Georgy Katsiaficas, "Neoliberalism and the Gwangju Uprising." Eroseffect.com, Prof. Katsiaficas’ personal and
professional website. Accessed September 20, 2013. http://www.eroseffect.com/articles/neoliberalismgwangju.htm.
182
Dukhong Kim, Democratization in South Korea during 1979-1987. Working paper. Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University, 1997. Blacksburg: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University: Department of
Political Science, 1997: 30.
181

Yang 77
might have turned out differently. While fulfilling the public’s call for rapid democratic
transition may have been difficult, at least there was an opportunity for procedural democracy if
the U.S. backed the reformers and the moderates. As Fowler argues, the fact that Choi did not
ally with hardliners indicates that “he must have desired a transition and believed it was
possible.” 183 After Park’s assassination, Choi had three options to move forward: ally with the
moderate opposition and seek a negotiated transition to democracy, ally with hardliners and
support renewed authoritarianism, or make no commitments. 184 Choi ended up with the last
choice and with it, opened the way for a coup that kept Korea on its impunity path.

Conclusion
As in the moment after decolonization in the 1940s-50s, the opening to democracy during
the brief “Seoul Spring” of 1979-80 was avoided by the lack of effective plan for democratic
transition and by institutionalized activities of several new veto-players, this time American
corporations, American domestic politics, and Hanahoe. The military, similar to that of the
earlier case study, transformed and built up itself as a legitimate power in Korean politics and
society. The failure to keep a check on veto-players located Korea onto an impunity pathway in
which impunity was institutionalized and veto-players consolidated their power, making
democratization much more difficult.
In this chapter I have argued that the period between Park’s assassination and General
Chun’s military takeover could have been utilized as an opportunity to move on from the
dictatorial legacy and bring historical justice, but it was thwarted by the existing hardliner forces
within and outside the Korean society, notably American corporations and U.S. domestic politics.
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America’s interest in its own security and stabilization in the Korean peninsula allowed room for
General Chun to rise in power, and eight more years of dictatorship and repression.
At the same time, while some may view this particular moment as a failed democratic
transition, the pro-democratization movement that was developing in Korean civil society during
this time paved way for the massive national democratization rallies during the Chun years. 185
Students, workers, and political dissidents, while they could not realize what they had hoped for,
built networks and planned for effective democratization process in the late 80’s. While the
democratic transition in 1987 was a success, it was clearly delayed because of the power of vetoplayers that resisted accountability for their crimes and protected Korea’s elites’ crimes.
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CHAPTER 4: JUSTICE DELAYED IS DEMORACY DELAYED: EVALUATING
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION IN KOREA, 1987-PRESENT
Introduction
This chapter will discuss the regimes that came after Chun’s dictatorship (1980-87) and
how democratic transition came about with the help of a nationwide democratic movement. After,
it will delve into truth and reconciliation process that started during the Roh Moo-Hyun
administration (2003-2008) and to the current Park Geun-Hye administration (2013-present).
The definition of consolidation of democracy will be applied to South Korea and measure the
quality of the nation’s democratic culture. Evidently, South Korea’s advance in democracy is
deceptive and its democracy needs further development to be fully consolidated.
Completing the path dependency analysis, I will show how choices that were made
during both critical junctures— the period between the mid-1940’s and early 1950’s and the
window of time from October 1979 to May 1980— led Korea to remain on the impunity path
after 1980. I will also discuss how the impunity path explains why Korea had a pacted transition
without historical justice, and why the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea was
limited, due to still existing veto-players. It is evident that human rights abuses committed by
veto-players were often protected and continued without any check. Impunity was continued and
historical injustice was partially resolved, and this has darkened the road to Korea’s
consolidation of democracy. Justice delayed is democracy delayed in the case of South Korea’s
democratization narrative.
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FIGURE 3: CHRONOLOGY
June 1987

June 10 Democratization Movement occurred

June 1987

Democratic transition began with the June 29 Declaration

December 1987
June,1988
March 1990
December 1992
August 1996

Roh Tae-Woo elected President
National Assembly held fact-finding hearings on the Gwangju Uprising
Special Law compensated victims of the Gwangju Democratic Movement
Kim Young-Sam elected President
Seoul District Court issued Chun a death sentence and Roh a 22 ½ year
imprisonment

December 1997

President Kim Young-Sam pardoned both Chun and Roh

December 1997

Kim Dae-Jung elected President

January 2000

December 2002
March 2004

Special Law established to restore the reputation and compensate those
involved in democratic movements, restore the reputation of victims
of the Jeju April 3 Incident
Roh Moo-Hyun elected President
Special Acts to investigate forced mobilization and pro-Japanese collaboration
under Japanese rule enacted

May 2005

Framework Act on Truth and Reconciliation established

July 2005

Special Law to investigate suspicious deaths in the military

December 2005

Truth & Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea established

December 2005

The Special Act to Redeem Pro-Japanese Collaborators' Property promulgated
and entered into effect

December 2007

Lee Myung-Bak elected President

December 2012

Park Geun-Hye elected President

Source: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea, Truth and Reconciliation: Activities of the Past Three
Years 18, 29 (2009). Accessed February 2, 2014. http://justicespeaking.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/trc-report.pdf
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Post-Chun Regime and the Critical Juncture of 1987: Towards Transition
After the May 1980 Gwangju uprising, military forces, who took up posts in both the
National Assembly and the administration, elected their coup leader, General Chun Doo-Hwan,
as president of South Korea under the indirect presidential election in which members of the
National Assembly voted for the presidential candidate. Political repression and killings of
political opposition silenced political dissidents. South Koreans had to wait another seven years
to enjoy political freedom and liberty from dictatorship.
Under the Chun regime from 1980 to 1987, more than a thousand people were falsely
accused of being North Korean spies. 186 They were indefinitely imprisoned and tortured for
violating the National Security Law and the Emergency Law. 187 The National Security Law was
used as a grand umbrella security law that prohibited any actions of plotting treason and posing
danger to the country. The KCIA used this particular law as their leverage to arrest and imprison
anyone they sought after.
From the beginning, the Chun regime lacked legitimacy and trust from its own citizens,
and it slowly sought ways to boost its popular appeal. By the end of 1983, the regime
implemented an “appeasement policy” to decrease oppression to a considerable extent. 188 Under
the new policy, students were able to re-enter school, and sanctioned professors returned to
universities. They also needed to maintain peace and order in order to successfully hold the 1986
Seoul Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics. The policy opened doors to a
growing pro-democracy movement. Students started a campaign to promote democratization that
led to direct struggle against the Chun’s regime. Then, the labor movement, along with
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movements of the urban poor and peasantry, joined in to the campaign. The student-labor
solidarity was consolidated as students left colleges and engaged in factory work disguised as
workers in order to participate in the labor movement themselves or to support workers. 189 The
political dissident movement resumed. They formed the Council for the People’s Democratic
Movement in June and the National Council for Democratic Reunification in October. 190
The year of 1984 was the watershed moment in which the democratization movement
developed drastically in all parts of civil society. Gu and Ki argue that the most significant factor
that accounts for the explosive growth of the democratization movement in the 1984 and 1985
was the “shock of the savage suppression by military forces in Gwangju.” 191 The army, whose
duty was to protect the lives of its citizens, dispatched elite airborne troops to massacre citizens
of Gwangju. This experience had enraged and shocked pro-democracy forces. Many felt guilty
for not lending a hand to innocent people in Gwangju, while the media labeled their resistance as
a communist uprising.
The 1980s pro-democracy activism was distinct and significant in that it was no longer
limited to the student movement and the dissident movement. It was now aligned with social
movements, especially with the labor sector. With Chun’s appeasement policy, the opposition
parties— the New Korean Democratic Party and the Korea National Party— that were excluded
from the political scene, reentered the political arena through the February 12th general election
in 1985 and expressed opposition to dictatorship and supported democratization move clearly.
With the democratization movement growing in every sector of the Korean society, it was then
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possible to form the largest democratic coalition. 192 The democratization forces proposed a
constitutional amendment for direct election of the president as their immediate goal. The Chun
regime repressed dissidents who argued for the constitutional amendment. Its extreme repression
against the movement resulted in serious violation of human rights. It tortured a prominent
dissident leader named Kim Geun-Tae, and, most significantly, tortured and killed Park JongCheol, a college student. 193 Park’s death stirred a massive popular uprising, and nationwide
ceremonies mourning his death occurred throughout Korea.
The democratization coalition decided to hold a massive national rally on June 10, 1987
to protest Park’s death and to demand an amendment for a democratic constitution. 194 This has
turned out to be the beginning of the June Democratic Uprising, which was the national protest
movement that forced the regime to accept the popular demand for democratization. The uprising
lasted for about 20 days until the June 29th, when millions of citizens came out to the streets
despite police repression. 195 The Chun regime finally announced a plan to resolve the situation.
The plan, also known as the June 29 Declaration, consisted of eight items— mainly, a
constitutional amendment for direct election of the president. 196 It finally opened the way to
democratic transition that would democratize the authoritarian regime in South Korea.
After the June Declaration, workers stirred up the nation by fighting for labor rights from
early July to September. Workers demanded their basic rights that had not been guaranteed under
Korea’s authoritarian regimes, such as wage increases, the improvement of working conditions,
the right to union representation and the right to collective agreements. There were five actors
during this process: hardliners (Chun Doo-Hwan) and reformers (Roh Tae-Woo) within the
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regime who recognized the need to negotiate, moderates and radicals in the opposition bloc, and
civil society’s pro-democracy organization, National Coalition for Constitutional Reform, that
worked with the opposition bloc.
Alongside workers’ protest, politicians started the process of democratic transition
according to the June 29 Declaration. All political parties assumed the task of amending the
Constitution. The Democratic Justice Party, the majority party, and the Reunification Democratic
Party, the main opposition party, had a political negotiation of eight leaders and drafted a
constitutional amendment based on direct election of the President with a single five-year term.
The bill was passed by the National Assembly, and the new Constitution was adopted on October
29, 1987, and presidential election campaigns began. However, voters became divided by the
fact that the two leading candidates of the opposition would not cooperate in the selection of a
single opposition presidential candidate. Votes were split between two opposition leaders, Kim
Dae-Jung and Kim Young-Sam, against Roh Tae-Woo, President Chun’s protégé. In the end, the
democratization forces lost the presidential election held on December 17. Roh Tae-Woo of the
Democratic Justice Party won 36.6%, candidate Kim Young-Sam of the Reunification Party won
28.1%, and candidate Kim Dae-Jung of the Party for Peace and Democracy won 27.0%. 197
The democratization movement brought about a democratic transition in South Korea
through the June Democratic Uprising, but it provided an opportunity for remnants of the past
dictatorial regimes to come back to power legitimately. By 1987, actors of the pro-democracy
coalition were able to win a pacted transition, but they weren’t able to win a transition with
justice, once again. Pro-impunity veto-players, despite the public’s call for democratization and
accounting of past wrong, still took firm hold of their place in the society and resisted
accountability of their history.
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South Korea’s Democratic Transition, 1987-92: Transition without Justice
President Roh Tae-Woo’s June 29 Declaration began the process of democratic transition,
especially the period between 1987 and 1992. The South Korean form of democratization was an
example of “pacted democracy.” 198 This is a democracy held together by an agreement among
elite groups of the country to bring about democratic transition without confronting impunity
through trials and investigations. 199 Both the reform group within the government and the
moderate opposition group compromised because they saw that the collapse of the government
would not meet their mutual interest. The reform group within the government, Roh Tae Woo
and his core group that led New Democratic Party, made a concession to restore formal
democracy, the moderate opposition group, Reunification Democratic Party, did not ask for the
reform group’s immediate exit from power and it took advantage of the reform group’s weak
incumbency. 200 This was possible because there was a strong and organized base of civil society
from numerous sectors such as students, workers, and priests that went against the Chun regime
and worked alongside the opposition bloc. With the negotiated transition engineered within the
political system, South Korea was able to sustain continuity in political, social, and economic
structures. 201
As the first civilian president in 32 years, President Kim Young-Sam was elected in 1993
and started his presidency with buoyancy from the nation’s high level of support. With strong
public support and personal charisma, Kim pushed to restore legitimacy, and took some steps to
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deepen democracy.

202

He tackled problems of corruption, the establishment of civilian

supremacy over the military as part of a firm military reform program, the implementation of a
vibrant market economy, and the amendment of political inspired laws. 203 His reforms were
designed to consolidate democracy by eliminating the old remains of authoritarian legacies.
However, as O’Donnell argues, the democratic transition process is always uncertain and
complex, and the possibilities for authoritarian regression are numerous. 204 Kim’s administration
did not fully consolidate South Korean democracy. According to Lee, his reforms merely posed
directions toward a democratic society and failed to produce positive outcomes in the longterm. 205 Even though they were driven by Kim’s strong will, they were not implemented
consistently. His reforms did not have the support of his political circle or reform groups, and he
was criticized for the undemocratic decision-making process that was characteristic of his
staff. 206 The failure of Kim’s government was apparent in the decline of his popularity and poor
economic conditions at the end of his tenure.
Kim’s focus was on building a moderate democratic system, in which he believed that
democratic government could emerge through free and fair elections. The restoration of a
democratic system was the essential goal after authoritarian rule. Yet, his understanding of
democracy as a procedure was not enough to achieve the consolidation of democracy.
Consolidation requires having members of the society playing on even field, especially
confronting impunity of the society. Yet, under Kim, democratic consolidation was limited, as
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evidenced by the fact that the only non-judicial truth commissions, not trials, were possible
during that time.

Almost but Not Quite: Trials and Truth Commissions of the 1990s
During President Kim Young-Sam’s term, there were new calls for prosecuting the
military leaders who had been instrumental in maintaining power and suppressing dissent during
the Chun regime. 207 Allegations of internal corruption and graft against Presidents Chun DooHwan and Roh Tae-Woo were disclosed, and led to their 1997 trial and conviction, along with
six other military leaders. 208 The charges ranged from military insubordination, subversion of the
constitutional order, and corruption. Seoul District Court issued Chun a death sentence and a fine
of $132 million, and Roh was sentenced a 22 ½ year imprisonment and a fine of $158 million.209
Several months after the conviction, however, the appellate court commuted Chun’s sentence to
life imprisonment and Roh’s sentence to seventeen years in prison. Then, in December 1997,
President Kim Young-Sam, following President-elect Kim Dae-Jung’s advice, pardoned Chun,
Rho, and other accomplices in the interest of national harmony and reconciliation. 210 With trials
clearly not possible, since then, truth commissions that are separate from the criminal justice
system have been the instrument of choice for addressing the past.
After Kim Dae-Jung’s election in 1997, public pressure for truth and commissions to
investigate past misconduct strengthened. Several new instrumental commissions were
established. The Commission for Restoring Honor and Compensation for Victims of
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Democratization Movements was tasked with deciding whether applicants were involved with
the democratization movement and to make recommendations regarding their treatment. 211 It
provided applicants with pardons for convictions and bestowed honorary diplomas. 212 The Truth
Commission on Suspicious Deaths was set up to investigate suspicious deaths that happened
during the authoritarian era. It maintained nine commissioners appointed by the President, and it
focused on deaths related to the democratization movement since August 7, 1969. The
commission received 80 petitions alleging suspicious deaths, and it confirmed 19 of the cases in
which they were a result of unlawful exercise of state power during the democratization
movement. 213 However, after much investigation and digging of the past, the prosecution of past
wrongdoers never materialized. This was because the choices that were made at earlier critical
junctures set Korea onto an impunity path. Powers of veto-players were protected and paths for
resolving historical injustice were closed and as a result, democratization was delayed even after
1987.

South Korea’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Finally, in 2003, President Roh Moo-Hyun, known for his work on behalf of human
rights during the 1980s, fully embraced the truth and reconciliation process. With wide support
from the National Assembly, he established more commissions and continued support for the
already existing ones. According to Wolman, the new commissions from this period are divided
into three categories: 1) the commissions that dealt with issues stemming from the Japanese
annexation and earlier; 2) the commission that dealt with human rights violations from the post211
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1945 era of authoritarianism; 3) the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea, which was
established as a larger and comprehensive commission that dealt with issues from both the
Japanese colonial and authoritarian eras. 214
As a result of Roh’s commissions, however, the political sphere became polarized, and
veto-players from the past were re-activated. Veto-players’ powers were once again protected
and resisted accountability of their past. Many conservatives had direct or indirect connections to
the authoritarian era and to collaborators from the Japanese colonial era. The Commission of
Confiscation of Properties of Pro-Japanese Collaborators was established in December 2005 to
identify and confiscate real property that was gained through pro-Japanese activities during the
colonial era. The commission had seized 23.7 million dollars’ worth of property from 168
individuals who had either inherited the properties or purchased them. 215 In terms of dealing with
the authoritarian era, the Roh administration established a number of commissions within
government agencies to reveal possible human rights abuses by the agencies during the
authoritarian era. The Policy Committee investigated the police involvement in massacres, fraud
elections, illegal surveillance and fabrication of evidence during the regimes. 216 The Defense
Ministry committee examined cases of forced conscription, military agent training, and a training
camp for civilians. 217 However, while property might have been confiscated and investigations
delving into human rights abuses during the authoritarian era were carried out, not a single
person was prosecuted under the rule of law. This lack of legal justice is a proof of how vetoplayers were able to exercise their power and stand protected by their institutionalized impunity.
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On July 31, 2005, in accordance to the Framework Act on Clearing up Past Incidents for
Truth and Reconciliation, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea (TRCK) was
established. The law was mainly drafted and introduced by National Assembly members of Roh
Moo-Hyun’s Uri Party. 218 Conservatives from the opposition Hannara Party had argued against
the commission, claiming that it will lose its objectivity and reflect political grudges in its
investigation. However, because of the Uri Party’s dominance in the Assembly at that time,
members of Uri Party went ahead and passed the bill. The TRCK was created with a stated
purpose to “foster national legitimacy and reconcile the past for the sake of national unity by
honoring those who participated in the anti-Japanese movements and investigating incidents
regarding human rights abuses, violence, and massacres occurring from the period of Japanese
rule to the present time; specifically during the nation’s authoritarian regimes.” 219
The TRCK was an investigatory body that responded to petitions submitted by the
general public. Investigations included site visits, archival research, and questioning of pertinent
authorities. It maintained fifteen Commissioners, including four Standing Commissioners, who
were appointed as public officers. 220 Commissioners served for a two-year term, with the
possibility of reappointment for a second term. The President appointed eight, four were
nominated by the President, and three were nominated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. 221 Most Commissioners have been lawyers, while a good number of others were
historians, religious leaders, and civil rights leaders.
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Despite these impressive-sounding structures, the Commission maintained relatively
weak powers to enforce cooperation. It was able to subpoena documents and evidence to be
turned over from state authorities, but they were often denied when officials claimed that the
evidence carried sensitive national security details. 222 By July 31, 2010, its investigations came
to a close, and it issued its final report on December 31, 2010. It investigated 11,175 claims
submitted by the public; of those, 8,468 claims were verified, 1,725 claims were dismissed, and
510 claims were unverified. 223 The TRCK put special focus on human rights abuse during the
authoritarian regimes. It examined cases relating to illegal or unfair exercise of state power,
serious infringements of human rights such as death, serious injury or disappearance and
instances of unjust court verdicts often regarding violation of the National Security Law. 224
Although critics claimed that the commission found nothing new, it also shed light on
how the U.S. forces committed human rights abuses during the Korean War. 225 Fundamentally,
the commission issued recommendations to both governmental officials and organizations. In
cases involving past massacres, recommendations focused on providing state apologies, revising
family registries, instituting memorial events, revising historical records, peace and human rights
education, law revisions, and medical subsidies for the wounded. 226 In human rights abuse cases,
it recommended retrials, state apologies, deletion of records, and the provision of compensation
and medical services for victims and bereaved families. 227 It also has recommended the
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government to pass a law awarding compensation to victims. The commission offered
recognition to victims of the past and apologies by the state agencies, and even President Roh
officially apologized for the State’s role in the Ulsan Bodo League in the 1950s when the State
violently suppressed suspicious leftists in Ulsan, resulting in the death toll of 100,000 to
200,000. 228
When the conservative Lee Myung-Bak administration (2008-2013) gained control,
however, his administration failed to continue the on-going efforts of rectifying the past and
minimally, procedurally carried out investigations of human rights abuse. The Lee administration
did not issue any official apologies. 229 While he chose not to renew the mandates of the TRCK
and did not issue an official English-language report by the end of its closure, he initiated a new
commission to address forced emigration during Japanese rule. 230

Any Justice by the TRCK?
In the theory chapter of the thesis, I argued that legal justice, using the rule of law with
due process for both prosecution and defense, is the best form of justice. The TRCK, due to
insufficient authority, lack of cooperation from other governmental organizations and lack of
time, was not able to reveal the truth to the fullest and enforce strongly on its recommendations.
It failed to impose adequate legal justice on those who benefitted from impunity and human
rights abuse, and ultimately it failed to provide adequate legal justice to the Korean society. In
the cases that the TRCK revealed and investigated, from the Japanese colonialism era to today’s
human rights abuse, the commission was only able to provide governmental recommendations,
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which were not enforced by the law. Namely, it gave recommendations to public authorities,
such as the Ministry of National Defense or the National Intelligence Service, that they give
formal apologies to victims and to the court for retrials. 231
Most notably, the generals and soldiers who were part of massacres and tragic killings
were not brought to justice. In the case of Cheongwon Bodo League Massacre, when, in the
wake of the Korean War, South Korean Police and the Counter Intelligence Corps massacred
232 civilians who were suspected as leftists, the commission exhumed 332 remains, 235 bullets,
and 300 other victim-related articles in Cheongwon County. 232 However, the government only
offered an official apology, provided peace and human rights education for soldiers, police, and
civil servants who were involved with the killing, supported memorial services for the victims,
and built permanent facilities to preserve the victims’ exhumed remains. This trend of
“government apology” is carried out in almost all of the cases that the commission investigated,
while no individual or entity is indicted on any charges. Accordingly, while the commission tried
to reconcile the past by recognizing the victims, identifying the perpetrators and offering
government apologies, it failed to fully set a precedent that anyone involved in past impunity will
be brought to justice and human rights abuse will not be tolerated. Only by legal prosecution can
victims be fully recognized and defendants face the consequences of their actions. As legal
scholar Diane Orentlicher writes, “Prosecution is the most effective insurance against future
repression.” 233 Trials in the criminal justice system do more than non-judicial commissions to
break down impunity. In the case of the TRCK, justice was minimally realized within procedural
and symbolic channels but impunity remained virtually untouched.
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The Impunity Path and the Consolidation of Democracy
There is an ongoing controversy among scholars of comparative politics and
democratization about what democratic consolidation entails. Generally, there is a divide
between those favoring a minimalist definition 234, which is backed by O’Donnell, Dahl, Stepan
& Skach; and maximalist definition 235 advanced by Gould, Chang, Dryzek, Kowert & Legro. 236
This thesis, while favoring a maximalist definition, focuses specifically on the political elements
of a broader definition of the consolidation of democracy that emphasizes “guarantees of civil
rights, democratic accountability, civilian control over the military, democratic and constitutional
checks on executive authority, and punishment of occupational and human rights abuses.” 237 At
the same time, my definition also includes punishment of past human rights abuses in a context
of truth and reconciliation within the process of democratic consolidation.
I would also argue further that adherence to human rights and legal justice promotes
democratic quality. 238 By rectifying abuses of the past, it establishes a culture of accountability
and respect for human rights, which are also core democratic values. 239 In order for a transitional
country to be democratically consolidated, its historical injustice must be amended and resolved.
The table below explains ways in which it reinforces democratic consolidation. 240
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Table 1.

Source: James Gibson, "The Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation: Lessons From South Africa." Journal of
Conflict Resolution 50, no. 3 (June 2006): 415.

Briefly, political tolerance supports extension of the rights of political competition.
Prevention of intergroup prejudice suspends group stereotypes and promotes intergroup trust and
cooperation. The support for human rights culture allows legitimacy for governmental officials
to use the rule of law with authority and make binding decisions. Lastly, by building and
certifying a collective memory of the past, truth and reconciliation can free the society from
obsession of past injustice and redirect political debate to contemporary issues.
In the case of Korea, while there is general acceptance that it has achieved a successful
democratic transition, scholars are skeptical about Korea’s consolidation of democracy. 241
Indeed, I will now identify four variables to investigate how Korea has not reached the stage of
consolidated democracy: individual rights and freedom of expression, checks and balance on the
executive power, transparency and accountability in its political institutions, and promoting truth
and reconciliation in the Korean society at large.
241
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The first area that is problematic is the lack of individual rights and freedom of
expression. By early 2000, the oversight of the National Intelligence Service, which was a major
state apparatus of surveillance and investigation of opposition parties during the authoritarian
regimes, was reduced and kept out of domestic politics. 242 Yet, there is still concern expressed by
the Amnesty International reports that Korea maintains the National Security Law that allows
arbitrary restriction of political rights such as freedom of expression and association. 243
Provisions of the National Security Law have been used to restrict the propagation of ideas that
authorities consider Communist or pro-North Korean. Given its situation vis-à-vis the North,
these restrictions are not surprising; however, they may hinder the ways in which citizens
practice their constitutional rights. In recent years, several journalists have been prosecuted under
criminal libel laws for critical or aggressive reporting. 244 Two of the three major television
networks, KBS and MBC, are owned by the government, which appoints presidents to these
networks. The neutrality and independence of the media is still controversial. 245
Another area is the difficulty in checks and balance on executive power. It is evident in
the recurring scandals involving big business groups and elected high-ranking officials. Korean
presidents under the authoritarian and democratic regimes were imprisoned and indicted on
charges of accepting bribes and kickbacks from large conglomerates in sums up to as high as U.S.
$900 million. 246 In May of 2009, President Roh Moo-Hyun, the human rights champion who
greatly expanded the role of the TRCK, was not immune from the widespread corruption
scandals, and committed suicide. He had acknowledged that a businessman who supported him
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had given more than $6 million to his wife and son and his brother’s son-in-law while he was in
office. 247 Roh, who publicly berated the powers of Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo in the
80’s and the 90’s, followed the footsteps of his predecessors— every former South Korean
president since the 1980s has faced corruption accusations or gone to prison on such charges
after his term was over. 248 Also, President Kim Dae-Jung was embroiled in a scandal when he
transferred $100 million through a government-supplied loan to North Korea before his
landmark summit meeting in North Korea. 249 The widespread corruption is linked to the culture
of breaking rules and ignoring the legal procedures among presidents. This impunity has located
Korea onto a pathway where veto-players resisted accountability and consolidated their power.
Shin and Chu argue that “in Korea, under the emperor-like presidential system,” the decision
making procedure for governmental policy has been ignored frequently in the past. 250 Just as the
Kim Dae-Jung administration illegally funneled a large sum of taxpayer money to North Korea,
presidents have often resorted to illegal methods to achieve their policy goals, especially in the
area of national security.
Third area is the dearth of transparency and accountability in its political institutions.
Korea has endeavored to promote the expansion of information about governing procedures to
the public. Reforms such as passing of the laws of Civil Servants Ethics in 1993, the Information
Disclosure Act in 1997, and the public confirmation hearings of high-ranking civil servants since
2000 have improved democratic accountability in Korea. 251 Nonetheless, Shin and Chu argue
that as political scandals involving bribes and kickbacks reveal, the information provided to the
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public is still limited and the process of policy-making still remains a murky area for citizens. 252
Hwang also adds that the legacy of the authoritarian regime leads to secret patterns within the
policy-making process. 253 Many high-ranking civil servants are appointed as a reward for their
contribution to the political success of presidential elections, instead of the competitiveness of
candidates. 254 The lack of a roll-call voting system and the small number of standing committees
exacerbate democratic accountability problems. 255 In 2003, the Korean EAB survey asked a
group of questions to Korean citizens. 256 When asked about the cover-up of illegal and corrupt
practices, a majority (total 54%) replied that the government does so “always” (12%) or “very
often” (42%). Another considerable portion (43%) said “sometimes” and a negligible minority
(%4) said “rarely.” When asked about the openness of governmental agencies to the public, only
about one-third of Koreans perceived the extent of openness as “a lot” (2%) or “somewhat”
(30%). More than two-thirds, on the other hand, said that government agencies were not much
open to the public (60%) or not open to it at all (8%). This number contributes to the general
public sentiment in Korean society that elected officials seek to avoid accountability to the
electorate.
Lastly, the lack of truth and reconciliation process in the Korean society remains an
obstacle to its democratic culture. As has been mentioned earlier, upon the establishment of the
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TRCK, it received 10,860 petitioned cases and 9,154 (84.2%) were chosen for investigation. 257
Governmental recommendations were made to resolve past conflicts and create an environment
for greater solidarity in the future. Accordingly, no trials were held. However, the commission’s
non-judicial nature did not adequately promote justice in the Korean society. The lack of legal
justice failed to put a check on veto-player’s power and undermined citizens’ trust in the
government.
The TRCK came to a close as its mandate expired in 2010. Dong-Choon Kim, one of the
scholars that helped investigate cases of the TRCK, argued that “there are many more that we
must study and research” even after the TRCK disbanded. 258 In an interview with Radio
Netherlands Worldwide, he emphasized that the legacy of suffering lives on among the families
of victims, adding “they still have some economic and psychological difficulties. Some
communities were totally devastated.” 259 He concluded that one of the reasons why the TRCK
was not extended was because “the current conservative regime doesn’t want to make this kind
of incident known to the Korean people and to other people.” The TRCK’s request for
documents and evidence was hampered by the lack of cooperation by the National Intelligence
Service and other governmental agencies. 260 There are still sites that must be exhumed and
investigated, and massacre accounts that must be heard and told. Today, there are still untold
truth and unresolved reconciliation that is deeply rooted in the Korean Society, and they will
hinder the political institutions from moving forward in focusing on contemporary issues and the
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future. Until this task is embraced by all political parties and completed, Korean society will be
far from the level of consolidation of democracy.

Today
As Park Geun-Hye, the daughter of dictator Park Chung-Hee, currently holds the
presidency, there has been a limited role in addressing past injustices. During her campaign, Park
stressed the idea of unity and reconciliation between past adversaries and visited the graves of
important democracy advocates. 261 While Park has discussed forming a commission to deal with
reconciliation issues, especially the ones that took place during her father’s dictatorship, she still
has not announced any concrete plans for investigation or mandates for such a body. In recent
times, her administration has focused more on addressing human rights abuses in North
Korea. 262 There may be the resurgence of old military-based veto-players, such as actors in the
national security apparatus, as the conservative Park administration takes a hard line on the
relationship with the North.
As a result, various civil society organizations have taken the lead in seeking historical
justice. The recently-formed Forum on Truth and Justice has attempted to take over the work of
the TRCK. The organization has published lists of individuals who collaborated with the
Japanese imperial regime. It recently issued its first list of 3,096 collaborators in 2005, which
included Park Chung-Hee and other prominent political figures. 263 Still, the division between the
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conservatives and liberals will remain over the truth and reconciliation issues. 264 While the
conservatives try to progress from the past and focus on human rights abuses by North Korea,
the liberals will seek the past and address past injustices by setting up commissions. The TRCK
has played a prominent role in initiating the process of addressing Korea’s past, and given that
trials are, at this point, impossible, it must be renewed to serve as an institutional channeling in
dealing with the after effects of a particularly turbulent twentieth century.

Conclusion
Even after Chun’s authoritarian regime came to an end in 1987 with the June Declaration, a
landmark success that was the result of Korean civil society’s well-organized protest, the
remnants of impunity and powers of veto-players were still deeply entrenched in Korean society.
Efforts to rectify historical injustice through organized investigative entities such as the TRCK
failed to bring legal justice to both defendants and victims of the past. Oftentimes, the effort to
bring justice was attacked by the conservatives and veto-players who tried to resist
accountability. This reflects the impunity path that Korea has taken on since independence and is
still following to the present day. Justice was thwarted and democracy was delayed. Only trials
in the justice system can eliminate remains of impunity and set a precedent that no one is above
the law. As a result, the culture of impunity is still present in Korean society. That is why,
despite the shortcomings of the model, the work of the TRCK, with the help of civil society
organizations, must be resumed to deal with the past and to fully consolidate Korea’s road to
democracy.

264

The divide between the liberal Democratic United Party and the conservative Saenuri Party reflects the
disjuncture between progressives and the conservatives, populist and political elites, and Honam, southwest region
of South Korea that supports the left and Yeongnam, southeast region that supports the right.

Yang 102
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, I have argued that South Korea’s democratic development has been
hindered by veto-players’ institutionalization of impunity that prevented a truth and
reconciliation process centered on prosecuting past regime crimes at certain moments of South
Korean history. I supported this standpoint by carrying out two case studies on two “critical
junctures” in Korean history— Chapter 2, the period 265 between the mid-1940’s and early 1950’s
and Chapter 3, the window of time 266 from October 1979 to May 1980. In each of the eras, the
institution of impunity became entrenched in Korean society and, over time, decayed democratic
culture and delayed democratization. They were special moments that opened doors to rectify
historical injustice and possibly, move forward with democratization. Nonetheless, the openings
for new, democratic change were aborted by veto-players, and the institution of impunity located
Korea onto a path where a dictatorial legacy still prevailed and veto-players consolidated their
power. The path-dependent effects of remaining on the impunity path after 1980, along with how
it set Korea up for a pacted transition without historical justice and how recent initiatives such as
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea have been limited due to the still-entrenched
veto-players and their resistance to impunity, are further discussed in Chapter 4.
This thesis also focused on ways in which the absence of legal justice as part of a truth
and reconciliation process affects a nation’s consolidation of democracy. Often, it de-legitimates
the current political regime and distracts the nation from focusing on contemporary and future
issues of the nation. As shown in Chapter 4, under democracy citizens expect the government to
be open and transparent, and thus the process of truth and reconciliation – even one without
prosecutions – can help. But prosecuting individuals, showing that nobody is above the law, is
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the crucial way for political institutions to be held accountable and resolve past wrongdoings that
come into attention time and again. Therefore, I have argued that a nation’s democracy cannot be
fully consolidated unless its past problems and abuses are amended. Evidently, this is still the
case in South Korea. There are still unresolved cases and hidden historical accounts of past
injustice co-existing at the center of post-authoritarian Korean society. Yet, as seen in the case of
the expiration of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea, the efforts to confront past
problems have been thwarted and failed to be renewed by the recent administrations.
On the other hand, South Korea’s developments in procedural democracy since the
transition have been substantial: a democratic constitution, free and fair elections, multiple
political parties, civil liberties, solid civilian control of the military, nonviolent horizontal power
transfers between opposition parties, and increased checks and balance among state
institutions. 267 Moreover, South Korea elected Park Geun-Hye, the daughter of former dictator
Park Chung-Hee, as its sixth democratic president. However, even in recent years, the country’s
democratic procedures seem to be deceptive and reveal structural difficulties. During the Lee
Myung-Bak

administration

(2008-2013),

Lee

carried

out

violent

measures

against

antigovernment protesters and demonstrators; attempted to curtail and suppress freedom of
expression and assembly in the name of uprooting politically motivated rumors; and made
unilateral policies focused on infrastructure construction that bypassed the National Assembly. 268
In November 2013, high-ranking officers of the Defense Ministry, including chief of the
National Intelligence Service, have been prosecuted and sentenced on charges of posting
thousands of anti-North Korean political message on blogs and spreading 1.2 million Twitter
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messages praising current President Park Geun-Hye ahead of the election. 269 These officials
praised government policies while attacking Ms. Park’s opposition as untrustworthy, pro-North
Korean sympathizers. In the weeks following the indictment, Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist and
other religious groups have issued statements demanding that Ms. Park resign on the grounds
that she may have benefitted from illegal means to election, while Park dismissed the demands.
Though it is early in her term, this scandal resurfaces the notion that every former South
Korean president since the 1980s has faced corruption accusations or gone to prison on charges
after the term was over. Park’s predecessor, Lee Myung-Bak, who is from the same political
party as Park, apologized publicly for scandals involving his brother Lee Sang-Deuk and Lee’s
close aides receiving a series of bribes from Samsung.

270

Presidents before Lee’s

administration— Roh Moo-Hyun, Kim Dae-Jung, Kim Young-Sam, Roh Tae-Woo— have all
been indicted and accused of bribery scandals. 271 In the end, Park Geun-Hye, with her party’s
troubles, may not be immune from recurring tales of scandals. The recent corruption cases
confirm that veto-players’ impunity, both undisclosed and made public, always resides in any
given era and gets in the way of consolidating democracy.
Thus, the on-going nature of scandals and corruption in current Korean politics calls into
question its prospects for democracy. The culture of injustice and impunity has taken over South
Korea since its independence in the 1940’s and has limited the nation from making citizencentered choices and free and fair structural changes, and thus, it must be dealt with at all costs.
One viable solution to mitigate this problem may be through activism and institutional checks by
269
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Korea’s vibrant civil society. Starting from early 2000, Korea’s civil society has gained much
support and traction by the Korean government. Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun built what is
known as “participatory government” that increased financial backing for civic groups and
encouraged direct civil society participation in the policy-making process. 272 Also, more recently,
the online “netizen” community has garnered considerable power as an informal force for
political and social change. 273
In particular, the role of civil society to counter government corruption has expanded in
terms of size and quality. In 1989, The Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) was
founded and helped establish the Real Name Financial Transactions System that requires all
financial transactions to be conducted in real, legal names. 274 This policy was initiated to forbid
any third party members from protecting the confidentiality of illegal transactions in order to
evade taxes. 275 People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) was founded in 1994
and developed a movement for business conglomerate (Chaebol) reform, political reform, and
eradication of injustice and corruption. 276 Notably in early 2000, citizen groups rallied together
for “Anti-corruption movement with people’s participation” and inaugurated a highly-respected
entity called Transparency International Korea. 277 Likewise, civic groups have not only drafted
various policies as alternatives to resolve corruption problems in the Korean society, but they
have also acted as major players in enacting anti-corruption legislation, such as the AntiCorruption Act and the Money Laundering Prevention Act both in 2001. Civil society groups are
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now requesting more measures to prevent corruption through a residents’ summons system, in
which residents of a province may summon the head of the local government for a public hearing;
enactment of Information Disclosure Act; reinforced protection for whistleblowers; a more
transparent personnel system in the government; and the expanded scope of administrative
disclosure. 278
Civil society has become a major force in Korea, and has been relatively successful at
protecting itself from manipulation by the state. 279 The clash between vibrant civil society as
well as social movement and the culture of corruption within the state suggests that we may be
approaching a contemporary “critical juncture” for South Korea. Just as Korean civil society and
social movements played crucial roles in pressuring the authoritarian government to exit, to
expedite the process of political transition, and to buttress a fragile democracy during the
transition, it must continue to hold the government accountable to its citizens and ultimately,
help consolidate its democracy. 280 According to Kim, social movements in Korea are constantly
evolving, and coalitions of different movement groups are becoming easier to form. 281 They also
coordinate and cooperate with political parties. Thus, further study on Korea’s democracy could
be focused on the current state of social movement in Korea and how it could be used as a
vehicle to bring about a judicial reform or political reconciliation to the Korean society. Also,
investigating further on how the work of TRCK has been carried out by civic groups such as
Truth and Justice Forum 282 will also shed light on how the pursuit of truth and reconciliation is a
continuing effort in Korean society, and significant role that civil society takes on in those efforts.
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Division within Korean society between those who benefit from impunity and those
whose rights are damaged by it must be bridged in order to fully consolidate its democracy.
South Korea is at the threshold of democratic consolidation, yet there is still a disjuncture
between the progressives and the conservatives, populist and political elites, and Honam and
Yeongnam 283. This state of disjuncture is a fragmented feature of today’s Korean politics. At the
heart of this disjuncture is historical injustice— two opposing forces clashing against prosecution
of pro-Japanese collaborators, ideological clash amongst political forces that ended in failure to
hold authoritarian regimes accountable, and most importantly, veto-players’ institutionalization
of impunity that set back the nation from moving forward with what people wished for:
democracy. What Korea needs today is healing and reconciliation from the past, but most of all it
needs the rule of law and an end to impunity. Only by confronting impunity, urging
reconciliation between existing political institutions, and constructing a truly democratic identity,
can Korea finally take off and achieve a legitimate, substantial, consolidated democracy that
transcends its contested and painful past.
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